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Finland is known for solid and big industrial vendor companies. Information technology 
changes industrial segment at the moment. Sensors are added to the industrial devices and 
all the information is communicated digitally to centralized storage. Devices can be mon-
itored and controlled remotely using the collected data. At the same time cybercrime busi-
ness is globally growing and smart industrial devices enables new way to attack compa-
nies. This research was done to understand what does Finnish industrial vendor compa-
nies think about cyber security threats and mitigation methods in industrial internet. 
The research was conducted by using existing literature as a theoretical framework. In-
dustrial internet system and its maturity is described in order to understand also infor-
mation security around the industrial internet. After understanding industrial internet as a 
phenomena information security for industrial internet is described. Research gives a 
high-level understanding of cyber-security related risks and mitigation methods in indus-
trial internet systems. Then the synthesis of theoretical framework was used in empirical 
part of this research. Six unstructured interviews were conducted for big Finnish indus-
trial vendor companies. Interview included questions about company’s industrial internet 
development, information security risks and mitigation methods. 
According the interviews there are not so big information security risks that the industrial 
internet can be implemented as its fullest. Companies pointed that top business risks from 
cyber security attacks are related that their products could cause interruption for produc-
tion or customer information could be leaked out. When companies are doing security 
work for industrial internet system digital identity, embedded security and physical threat 
are the top 3 information security risks.  Industrial internet security work is focused a lot 
to sensor and transformation level in industrial internet architecture. In addition, active 
information security management process, security training for employees and reliable 
technology partners are in a key role for successful industrial internet information security 
work.  
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Suomi tunnetaan isoista ja vakaista teollisuuden laitetoimittaja yrityksistä. Tällä 
hetkellä tietotekniikka muuttaa teollisuuden segmenttiä. Sensoreita lisätään teol-
lisiin tuotteisiin ja kaikki niiden keräämä informaatio tallennetaan keskitettyihin 
pilvipalveluihin. Teollisia laitteita voidaan etänä ohjata ja seurata teknologian an-
siosta. Samaan aikaan kyberuhkien ja hyökkäysten määrä kasvaa maailmalla ja 
lisääntyvä määrä älykkäitä teollisia laitteita avaa yrityksistä hyökkäyspinta-alaa 
kyberhyökkäyksille. Tämä tutkimus tehtiin, jotta voidaan ymmärtää mikä on suo-
malaisten teollisten laitetoimittajien käsitys teollisen internetin tietoturvasta ja sen 
suojausmenetelmistä.  
 
Olemassa olevia tutkimuksia ja kirjallisuutta käytettiin teoreettisen kehyksen luo-
miseen. Koska tietoturvallisuutta käsitellään tutkimuksessa suhteessa teolliseen 
internetiin, teollinen internet ja sen maturiteetti on avattu teoreettisessa viiteke-
hyksessä hyvin. Kun teollinen internet ilmiönä tunnetaan, kerrotaan teollisen in-
ternetin tietoturvasta. Tutkimus antaa korkean tason ymmärryksen teollisen inter-
netin tietoturvauhkista ja niiden mitigointi-menetelmistä. Teoreettisen viitekehyk-
sen jälkeen teetettiin puolistrukturoituja haastatteluita kuudelle suomalaiselle te-
olliselle laitetoimittajalle. Haastattelut sisälsivät kysymyksiä teollisen internetin 
kehityksestä ja maturiteetista. Tämän lisäksi tarkasti käsiteltiin teollisen internetin 
tietoturvaa liiketoimintariskien ja konkreettisten tietoturvariskien näkökulmasta. 
 
Haastattelujen mukaan ei ole olemassa niin suuria tietoturvauhkia, että teollisen 
internetin potentiaalia ei pystyisi ottamaan käyttöön niin kehittyneesti kuin mah-
dollista. Yrityksen osoittivat, että suurimmat liiketoimintariskit teollisen internetin 
tietoturvassa on tuotannon jatkuvuuden ongelmat ja asiakasdatan vuotaminen. 
Kun yritykset tekevät teollisen internetin tietoturvatyötä identiteetinhallinta, sulau-
tettu ja fyysinen turvallisuus ovat kolme suurinta mainittua tietoturvauhkaa. Teol-
lisen internetin tietoturvatyö keskittyy laitteisiin ja niiden liikenteeseen pilveen 
asti. Tämän lisäksi tutkimuksessa tuli ilmi, että aktiivinen tietoturvan hallinnan 
prosessi, työntekijöiden kouluttaminen ja luotettavat teknologia kumppanuudet 
ovat avainasemassa tietoturvatyö onnistumiselle. 
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LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ADC Analog-to-Digital converter changes analogical signal such as tem-
perature to digital signal which can be digitally transferred and 
stored.  
API Application Programming Interface means software interface which 
enables the integrations between applications and cloud services. 
DoS Denial of Service is a cyber security attack where attackers are trying 
to make applications or services unavailable. This is usually done by 
flooding. 
GDPR The General Data Protection Regulation is a regulation by European 
Parliament for strengthen and unify data protection for all individual 
in European Union area. 
ICT Information and Communications Technology means technology and 
machines that enables digital communications and processes. 
IoT   Internet of Things means any digital or not digital object, e.g. house-
hold appliance, to connect Internet and communicating with each 
other in order to participate business processes. 
IIoT  Industrial Internet of Things is Internet of Things in industrial seg-
ment. Industrial machines and sites are connecting the internet, cre-
ating their own connected systems. Can be also said as Industrial In-
ternet. 
M2M  Machine-to-machine means automatic communications between ma-
chine without human interface.  
UI User Interface is a way how humans and machines interact in order 
to operate and control. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation and background 
World is changing faster than ever and the new industrial revolution is coming. Techno-
logical development enables today that everything can be connected into the internet. At 
the moment people can socialize, work and shop through internet, but what will happen 
when machines are talking with each other’s? (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016; Kumar & 
Patel, 2014) 
In industrial sector, companies see the potential of re-shaping the markets, make value 
and growth and competitive advantage with ‘connecting the unconnected’. In Finland, 
industrial internet revolution has identified as one of the key themes by the Prime Minis-
ter’s office. It is said, that Finland will be the future Silicon Valley of industrial internet.  
However, this trend brings also a big elephant on the table; cyber security. When millions 
of devices are connected to the internet, it reveals a lot of attack surface for attackers. One 
of the finish industrial internet visionary and business man Pekka Lundmark has said that 
industrial internet will rise or fall over the data security (Lehto, 2015). Also, World En-
ergy Counsel warns that the sector is prime target for cyberattack (World Energy Council, 
2016). For example, in June 2010 Iran was attacked by the worm called Stuxnet and it 
destroyed Tehran’s 1000 nuclear centrifuges and set back Iran atomic program over two 
years and the worm also infected over 60,000 computers beyond the plant (Telegraph, 
2010). In 2015, Ukrainian electric power sector was attacked with custom malware and 
80,000 people were without electricity over six hours (Zetter, 2016). Knowing the attack 
risks, companies need to be prepared. This research will go behind the curtains of manu-
facturing companies in Finland and helps to understand what are the cyber risks for in-
dustrial internet and how the risks are understood. (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016; Lehto, 
2015) 
The main motivation behind the cybercrime is money. The Jupiter Network research es-
timates that the cybercrime will cost companies total $2.1 trillion by the year 2019 
(Rooheart, 2017). Being a cybercriminal also known as a black hat hacker does not need 
very special skills. Hacking tutorials and black markets for cybercrime are reachable with 
internet connection. In many cases the risk is really low and risk of getting caught is 
significantly lower than with traditional criminal. Countries with most hackers are mostly 
poor ones for example Russia, China, Nigeria, Vietnam and Romania (Rayman, 2014). 
Poor countries are unable to afford specialized technologies to deal with hackers. Accord-
ing to PWC study (PWC, 2016) in 2016 46% of internal actor and 41% of external actor, 
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this means that almost half of the fraudsters came from the same organization. The num-
ber of external fraudster are increasing, mainly because global network availability and 
computing skills. 
Industrial sector is changing currently from embedded systems to IP-based cyber physical 
systems. According PWC’s study (PWC, 2016) some industry sectors have experienced 
increase of crime incidents in the past 24 months. These industry sectors are aerospace & 
defence, manufacturing, transportation & logistics and energy industry. Hackers have 
found out that many suppliers have gaps in their security which can be easily exploited. 
This was not an issue before, because devices were connected in a closed system or did 
not have intelligence at all. Cisco predicts (Evans, 2011) that there will be roughly 50 
billion devices connected to the internet by the year 2020 and Hewlett Packard study 
(Miessler, 2014) reveals that 70% of Internet of Things devices are vulnerable to attack. 
And this is not only a consumer problem, companies need to look carefully also their 
industrial systems with the same risk. So, when cybercrime business is booming and 
hackers will have more and more unprotected devices to play with, how are the companies 
prepared for the attacks? 
In this research, I will dive into Finnish industrial vendor industry. At the moment, indus-
trial internet hype is tangible and companies are in different states of creating new busi-
ness value with connecting devices. How have companies prepared for the change and 
the risks and how the companies see different risks? This research will help to understand 
what is the industrial internet, what is a theoretical framework for securing the industrial 
internet and how have Finnish industrial vendor companies understand and are prepared 
for cybercrime. 
1.2 Research goals and structure 
The goal of this study is to create a mutual understanding between industrial internet and 
main cyber risks.  
The main goal can be derived for one research goal (RG): 
RG1: What are industrial internet information security risks and how they should 
be mitigated in Finnish industrial vendor segment?  
Research goal is an outcome from different research questions. Research will give an-
swers to these research questions (RQ): 
RQ2: What kind of information security risks appears in different levels of indus-
trial internet architecture? 
RQ3: Why is it important to invest in industrial internet cyber in industrial vendor 
segment? 
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RQ4: What is the role of industrial vendor company in industrial internet infor-
mation security? 
In order to answer the main research questions, research must be broken into different 
sections. Firstly, research sets up a theoretical framework for the research. Theoretical 
framework answers to these sub-questions (SQ): 
SQ1: What is industrial internet by architecture and maturity? 
SQ2: What kind of cyber risks there are in industrial internet? 
These sub-questions are extensively answered in theoretical framework (Sections 2 and 
3). Framework creates a steady platform to implement the information towards the re-
search questions and goals. 
Work order of this research is firstly answer to theoretical framework, then for the re-
search questions and lastly pull together answer for the research goal. 
 
Figure 1. Work order 
1.3 Scope and limitations 
The world of Internet of Things is wide. Internet of Things will affect both consumer and 
business segments and there are plenty of applications. 
This research is focused with the manufacturing category. Even inside manufacturing 
segment there are many applications like factory floors, industrial automation vendors 
and industrial vendors. Scope of this research is industrial vendors. In Finland, industrial 
vendor companies have already woken up for the industrial internet change. 
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Figure 2. IoT market segmentation (Lueth, 2014) 
Finland is an interesting market to explore industrial internet related topics. There is 
global manufacturing companies and huge amounts of technology and software expertise. 
According to Accenture and Frontier Economics research about industrial internet growth 
opportunities Finland ranks third after United States and Switzerland (Miessler, 2014). In 
Finland, there is ongoing my different kind of growth programs. In 2008 FIMECC (Finish 
Metals and Engineering Competence Cluster) was found to make Finland a recognized 
leader of industrial internet business. 
 
Figure 3. Scope of the research 
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Many of the global finish manufacturing companies have a strategy for the industrial in-
ternet. They have completed many different kind of industry hacks to innovate their busi-
ness models and development. This research is focused on industrial vendor companies. 
It means that they have specific industrial internet architecture. They produce industrial 
goods for bigger entities, e.g. cranes for harbours. That means that products will have 
smart connections within the factory, customers, supply chain, maintenance and produc-
ers. Of course, most of the companies have their own production plants but this research 
will focus on the ecosystems created by the end products. 
1.4 Research methodology 
In order to make right conclusions in the research we need to compare different kind of 
philosophes and approaches. 
This research is based on qualitative data collection. Objective is to gain an understanding 
of underlying reasons, beliefs and motivation behind industrial internet cyber security. 
(Hennink et al., 2010). The main research goal is to find out why to invest to information 
security in industrial internet. The problem is that there is no unified method to ensure the 
security of industrial internet. That’s why it is really important to understand the beliefs 
and feeling inside interviewed companies. 
Research consist theoretical framework and empirical section. Theoretical framework 
creates a ground to examine research questions. In empirical sections Finish industrial 
internet companies in the segment of industrial vendors.  
Empirical information was collected with semi-structured interviews. Interviews were 
completed with a list of questions and specific questions, but there might be some variates 
between the interviews, depending on what topic there is some extra information. That 
way interviews can be also lead by respondents’ priorities and opinions of the subject. 
With semi-structured interviews, we can examine the topic deeper and maybe find out 
something that was not able ask within the question frame. This is because interviewed 
companies are not in the same level of industrial internet an understanding how do the 
Finnish industrial vendor companies are understanding the cyber risks of industrial inter-
net. 
Table 1. Summary of research methodologies used 
Concept Methodology Effect to research 
Philosophy • Hermeneutics Qualitative research 
method which enables to 
gain deep understanding 
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around the subject using 
subjective interpretations.  
Approach • Qualitative 
• Deductive 
Enables to increase overall 
understanding of the topic. 
Can explore expressions 
and culture behind the 
questions from the organi-
zations and motivations. 
Deductive approach refers 
to logical thinking and 
analysis of the results. 
Information gathering and 
analysis 
• Existing research 
literature and arti-
cles for theoretical 
framework 
• Semi-structured in-
terviews for gather-
ing empirical infor-
mation 
• Empirical infor-
mation and theoret-
ical framework are 
combined and ana-
lysed together. 
In the research two differ-
ent kind of theoretical basis 
are combined. In order to 
answer research goal, in-
formation must be gathered 
from different organisa-
tions. 
Strategy is to use semi-
structured interviews 
which is not a survey and 
goes not under case study 
strategy.  
Results and conclusions • Results is under-
standing the role of 
information secu-
rity in industrial in-
ternet projects 
• Conclusions about 
how information 
security is felt with 
industrial internet 
business 
Results of the research are 
overall making a better un-
derstanding of the subject 
Interviewed companies are 
summarized organization-
ally about the results and 
how did the companies an-
swers compared to other 
companies. 
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2. INDUSTRIAL VENDOR IIOT 
2.1 Definition of Industrial Internet 
First time industrial internet was introduced in 2000 with Frost & Sullivan article, back 
then industrial internet applications were really expensive and difficult to implement, 
even if the applications were pretty simple. After 12 years Evans (Evans & Annunziata, 
2012) introduced term industrial internet second time with his famous GE article and then 
the timing was right. According Evans, industrial internet has three key elements; intelli-
gent machines, advanced analytics and people at work. In the past decades, there are lot 
of technological innovations around computing, network connections and the Internet. 
Now those innovations can be combined into most industries. Intelligent machines mean 
connecting the world’s machines, platforms and facilities with sensors and software. The 
low-cost and level of connectivity around sensors and IT-systems is propitious. Advanced 
analytics means the advanced ways to perform physic-based analytics, predictive algo-
rithms and deep engineering know-how about material science, electrical engineering and 
production. People at work refers to connecting people and allowing better service quality 
and security. (Evans & Annunziata, 2012) 
Industrial Internet Consortium, IIC, has defined industrial internet like this (Industrial 
Internet Consortium, 2015): 
“The Industrial Internet is an internet of things, machines, computers and people, ena-
bling intelligent industrial operations using advanced data analytics for transformational 
business outcomes. It embodies the convergence of the global industrial ecosystem, ad-
vanced computing and manufacturing, pervasive sensing and ubiquitous network connec-
tivity.” 
Today there are many interconnected systems, which uses software, sensors and data-
bases. But these industrial control systems have not been connected to wider systems or 
with the people working with them. (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015) Industrial In-
ternet brings Industrial control systems online to form large systems and connecting with 
people and analytics solutions. According Industrial Internet Consortium Industrial Inter-
net systems cover energy, healthcare, manufacturing, transportation and related industrial 
systems.  
Term machine-to-machine also known as M2M means communication between machines 
and also according to Saarelainen (2016) the term is in many ways synonym with indus-
trial internet from a narrow point of view. Machine-to-machine refers to advanced and 
autonomous machine communications between each other’s via connected software and 
artificial intelligence.  
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It is good also to define the difference between Industrial Internet of Things and Internet 
of Things. IIoT is defined as a part of Internet of Things. Internet of Things means con-
necting any unique device with the communications protocol. Common factor is also that 
things communicate with each other and with the systems and cloud services, where the 
data can be saved and analysed. Internet of Things is an umbrella term and industrial 
internet is one theme under it. According the ETLA report (Juhanko et al., 2015) indus-
trial internet means likewise the business perspective of the whole Internet of Things and 
rest means consumer perspective. Also, the government gives their own additions with 
the terms information society when open data is connected with public sector services. 
With the industrial internet, the expected life cycle is assumed to be decades and with the 
consumer business life cycle is a lot faster (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). 
Industrial internet still does not achieve its goals when companies have connected devices 
with data management and applications. Industrial internet is actually born when business 
processes, products and services are connected to the network and the ensemble is creat-
ing databased services. The difference between todays industrial internet and old-style 
industrial control systems are that in ICS systems software was embedded into the prod-
ucts and with industrial internet products and services are embedded with software. So, 
software defines what are the features at that time. (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016)  
According Porter and Heppelmann (2014) industrial internet is all about how smart, con-
nected devices change interfaces of industry sector and reshapes industry sector. Briefly 
new relationships, new processes and new structures for business are created with three 
core elements; physical components, smart components and connectivity components. 
Porter and Heppelmann ground their definition more business perspective. They see that 
the technology offers a radical shift for industry and business processes, value and supply 
chains must be rethought. This also questions the organizational structures and strategies. 
2.2 Fourth industrial revolution 
Megatrends are born when structures of global society are examined from economic, so-
cial, technological or political point of view. Different industries, people and society 
structures are affected with megatrends are the trends are usually proceeded long before 
noticing.  
The world is facing a new era of innovation in industry sectors. Before exploring the 
industrial revolution, it is good to define the facing changes of the world. Three key meg-
atrends are globalisation, digitalisation and urbanization (Juhanko et al., 2015). The con-
sequence of these megatrends is that people are acting differently and new kind of value 
and supply chains are innovated. Also, megatrends with environmental aspects like global 
warming are indirectly affecting with industrial revolution development. At the moment 
digitalisation enables industry sector to take the next step.  
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The main drivers enabling the revolution: 
- Sensors fall in the price, low-power and better performance 
- Internet enabling explosive growth of connected devices 
- Big data, analytics and storage price decrease 
- Consumer awareness and user interfaces 
- Business acceleration (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). 
First industrial innovations were happened in the end of 1700 century when steam ma-
chines were invented and adapted into factory facilities. The main theme back then was 
that the machines were creating power for the first time with the mechanical automation. 
The second industrial revolution was completed with electrical power and that enables 
mass production and more advanced production lines. Third revolution was born when 
electronics and IT were implemented with the automation.   
 
 
Figure 4. Four industrial revolutions (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016) 
Fourth industrial revolution is also known as industry 4.0 is an on-going smart change 
through cyber-physical systems (Lee, 2014). Like said before, revolution is possible today 
because of the software development. The term Industrie 4.0 is the most known strategic 
initiative to exploit the potential of the industrial internet. Originally Industrie 4.0 is in-
vented in Germany in 2013 as their principal project (Juhanko et al., 2015). This national 
development program is defined same way as the industrial internet. The goal is to em-
phasize the enhancement and optimization of industrial manufacturing systems with these 
basic elements; sensors, operating devices, local intelligence, communication networks, 
cloud technology, analytics and analytics-based decision-making. (Juhanko et al., 2015). 
According Technische Universität Dortmund (Hermann et al., 2015) Industrie 4.0 in-
cludes six main design principles: 
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Table 2. Industry 4.0 six design principles 
Interoperability Ability to connect and communicate between cyber-physical 
systems, smart factories and people. Standards will be key 
success factors with connecting these things.  
Virtualization Virtual copy and simulation models of smart factory which is 
created by connecting physical world sensor data with virtual 
models and simulations. Humans are supporting with this 
principal. 
Decentralization Autonomous decision-making by the embedded devices and 
systems. For quality and traceability, it is important to keep 
track the whole systems all time. 
Real-time capability Capability to collect and analyse data and offer derived results 
in real-time. And the factory is permanently tracked and ana-
lysed.  
Service orientation Offering services over IoT and can be utilized by the other 
participants and offer customer specific requirements. 
Modularity Flexible adoption of smart factories with replacing or expand-
ing unique modules. With good modularity, seasonal fluctua-
tions and changed products are easily managed. 
 
Software development is the main key while examining the 4th industrial revolution. 
Software enables most of the industrial internet features. Even if the revolution is possi-
ble by the technology, it is important to keep business value creation, business models 
and service-culture in the core (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016).  
2.3 Industrial internet maturity and future 
Near past in industrial sector there was two business participants; the producer and the 
user. Added value is based from the physical use of the technology. Today industrial 
vendor companies are developing services and integrating their technology into system 
level solutions. Competition drives towards system level industrial internet solutions in 
order to bring customer value. Service provider gets huge amount of information about 
the use and operations of the services. Every customer gets information from used prod-
ucts, maintenance status alerts and abuse of the devices. Also, customer can make changes 
with the configurations of the used services. Industrial internet development can pre-
sented with steps. This development is described in this section as a maturity model of 
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industrial internet. (Juhanko et al., 2015; Viitamo, 2014) Industrial internet maturity 
model is important to this thesis, because information security risks and mitigations are 
reflected to the maturity model. 
Companies are not able take the full capability of industrial internet in use immediately. 
Product and business development happens in cycles and the business models also grows 
with the rest process. The maturity of the industrial internet can be described with follow-
ing evolution:  
 
Figure 5. M2M Maturity model. (Shan, 2015) 
In general, maturity is related to technological capabilities. Firstly, machines and devices 
are connected and then sensor-created data and background system data are stored, de-
vices remotely monitored and creating information of the data. After this foundation, 
deeper business value-adding opportunities can be created. Data analytics, algorithms and 
software applications industrial internet can be implemented with higher maturity. Then 
business processes, decision making processes can be outsourced for the systems. At the 
highest level, autonomous decision making is implemented and human intervention can 
be totally taken out of. This is important to understand in this context, because also the 
information security risk and methods, which are described later on, can be different in 
every level of maturity model. 
Always getting to the next step require prior step elements to be implemented and taken 
over new capabilities. These steps are so called change drivers which means that realiza-
tion of capabilities of certain step company can have a transition to the next level. It is 
12 
not default that companies are aiming for the highest point of the maturity model. Posi-
tioning should be a strategic choice within this scale, but practically developing with ma-
turity means that companies have to adjust their business processes with the whole value 
chain and with the organisations dealing with the process. Of course, changing business 
models often means new competition. Also, market and innovation potential grows when 
company grows the maturity from embedded systems to open environment (Juhanko et 
al., 2015). 
 
 
Figure 6. The adoption and impact path (World Economics Forum, 2015) 
Figure 6 shows basically how the future will likely follow. Perspective is a bit same with 
the maturity model (Figure 5) but it gives options also with new business models. As 
figures shows business models are highly dependent of the technology maturity. For 
many companies’ operational efficiency and smart connections are not new opportunities, 
most of the big players have had these technologies already about 20 years. But the new 
factory in this sector is the data management, big data and cloud based services. To create 
future business models, highly sophisticated algorithms and analytics are implemented.  
Examining Figure 6 the near-term goals can be achieved within 2 years of industrial in-
ternet development. According World Economics Forums research (World Economics 
Forum, 2015) the long-term disruptions will occur in five years. Long term goals are more 
challenging steps towards new business models, because data management and analytics 
are far more complex than low-maturity development. The goal is to create value-adding 
models with data. Value adding model is not selling just the equipment but the pricing is 
based for example the use or production value.  
When creating and implementing new business models it is vital to understand the effec-
tiveness for the supply and subcontracting chains. The paradigm of these chains should 
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be from a hierarchical network to service network. The formation of service networks 
contributes the industrial internet business model development. 
 
Figure 7. From supply chain to service network (Mountreuil, 2012) 
Figure 7 visualizes the change from original supply chains to service networks. Service 
network is created when smartly linked users are exploiting open interfaces of service 
network. Instead of ordinary buying and selling process, implementing product function-
ality is highlighted for example via renting collaboration use. 
For industrial internet, there are many areas of applications, but there are some more 
adapted models which are presented below; asset management, predictive maintenance, 
smart factory and service business. But of course, outside of these four models every 
company is thinking how to create most value-adding model for their own benefits. 
Asset management 
Asset management means that company has clear and exact view of their own assets and 
their manufactured products. Asset management requires that devices are equipped with 
sensors, connected to internet and cloud based services. As a result, company can get the 
following features possible (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016): 
• Remote optimization 
• Remote management 
• Remote updates 
• Remote control and remote use control 
 
In this phase, industrial internet maturity is very low but companies can gain big value of 
getting connected remotely with their assets.  
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Remote controlling means the information about who, when and where the device is used. 
Then company can ensure that users have authority to use the product. Improper use can 
be stored to the system and can be used for example user training purposes.  
 
The other perspective of the asset management is gaining performance information of the 
products. With the information abuse, can be analysed and overall performance can be 
analysed from the whole life cycle. This helps to development of the products and finding 
and refining troubleshooting.  
 
Remote management means that user is able to control device or processes remotely. 
Management is using the product, and optimization is about the device configuration. 
Productivity and revenue are increased during the process. Remote updates enable to re-
motely update devices even to sensor level. This is important, because devices contain a 
lot of software.  
Predictive maintenance 
Predictive maintenance is one of the biggest industrial internet opportunities. Companies 
are expecting to gain utilization, prevent interruptions in production and to speed up 
maintenance shutdowns. Usually predictive maintenance is the first application area for 
companies when entering the industrial internet era. Predictive maintenance means that 
machine or device maintenance-need is solved from the real-time information. Sensor 
data with history gives the status of the condition of the machine, and it is reasoned when 
should it maintain. Predictive maintenance includes parts of the asset management. In 
predictive maintenance alarms are set when pre-defined limit-values are violated. In pre-
dictive maintenance analytics are used to find anomalies from the data automat. Goal is 
to maximize device capacity and ensure its stability. Manufacturing companies and ven-
dors can have quick wins in this area, but it means that the analytics and knowledge of 
the devices are strong. Usually collecting the history data slows down implementing pre-
dictive maintenance as its full capacity, because in order to analyse data there must be a 
lot of history data. (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016; Juhanko et al., 2015) 
Industrial internet era predictive maintenance replaces old ways of doing the mainte-
nance. Traditional and old preventive maintenance actually means that there is service 
offer before the faults. In time-based maintenance service is offered by pre-scheduled 
timing or e.g. certain machine-time is exceeded. But industrial internet offers now that 
condition-based maintenance can bring into play. The benefits of the predictive mainte-
nance are (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016): 
• More efficient use of machines 
• Reduce maintenance expenses 
• Reduce unpredictable disorders 
• Prevent degradation of the equipment 
• Identify underperforming devices 
• Improve the quality of production 
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• Machine anti-aging 
• Need-based maintenance 
• Reduce maintenance travel expenses 
• Release spare parts capital 
The benefits of predictive maintenance show that it really offers significant monetary 
benefits. 
Service business 
When manufacturer have the outlook to their devices the business earning models can 
also be customized by the need. For example, manufacturers can sell their products as 
“product-as-a-service” which means that invoicing of the devices is based on operating 
hours, volume of the production or even on reduction in production downtime. There is 
then lower threshold to buy the products (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). This type of in-
voicing is called also by “pay-per-outcome” or “pay-per-use” (Mountreuil, 2012). 
When manufacturers can analyse the data, and run predictive maintenance, they can also 
offer “after-sales” products. For example, they can offer analytics based remote optimi-
zation and updates. And of course, new applications can be created, which can help cus-
tomers e.g. manage their products with mobile interface. Also, the sensor-data as a big 
mass enables trading. This offers also 3rd party players to create applications with the 
data. (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016) 
Fleet management means that device supplier collects database from supplied devices, 
owners, locations and maintenance. With that information spare part sales, maintenance 
and other services can be developed. Fleet management can be also used as operational 
purposes like device management. (Juhanko et al., 2015) 
Smart Factory 
Smart factory means a factory where every single device is sensored and connected into 
same network, database and analytics platform. The wholeness makes factory adaptable 
and releases human interface from adjust and monitoring. Smart factory adapts according 
the production and it is able to communicate with humans. 
Smart factory is flexible, homing system which creates monitoring by itself and plans the 
production according the needs. Smart factory can that way save capital by removing 
human work, minimalizing commodity and resources. When the system faces faults, it 
self-directs the bottle-necks and re-plan the production. 
Smart factory enables fast go-to market with products and it responses to growing cus-
tomer needs. Before it has been really difficult to plan smaller production series but now 
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it is possible to tailor production without insane rise of costs and timing. This leads to the 
concept that the value chain controls itself. Human still manages the factory but no human 
intervention is needed with smaller decisions in productions or resource management. 
(Saarelainen & Collin, 2016) 
In smaller scale, smart factory and its flexible production can be implemented with 3D 
printers, laser cutters, and CNC machine tools. With big factories, smart capabilities have 
already been adapted mostly before with expensive SCADA systems, but now processor 
power is increasing so they are powerful enough to handle real-time streams from differ-
ent devices and make analytics. (Bruner, 2013) The factory equipment and software is a 
mix with different kind of technologies and vendors participating in it. Thus, the factory 
is working together with all of its elements.  
2.4 Industrial internet architecture 
There is two ways approach the architecture of industrial internet; the architecture of im-
plementation and the architecture of industrial internet solution. In this thesis, the solution 
approach is gone through more specifically than the implementation. It is important to 
understand the solution and layers of architecture before considering information security 
aspect. The architecture of the solution is based on the system level and technology plat-
form. Architecture presented can be generalized what the industrial internet and even the 
IoT basically is.  
Connected products require companies to build a technology infrastructure (Porter & 
Heppelmann, 2015). Infrastructure simplifies how the data moves and refines through the 
technology layers. Basically, the architecture tells how the data is altered to information 
and that way to business understanding and digital services. Before business understand-
ing and digital services there are no industrial internet, because in that point company is 
only able to sell their products which compounds different stakeholders (Saarelainen & 
Collin, 2016). 
General IoT architecture consists three different layers; sensing layer, service and cloud 
layer and application layer (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015). In Industrial Internet 
Reference architecture (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015) these layers in the same 
order are called; edge tier, platform tier and enterprise tier. The infrastructure is made up 
with multiple layers of technology. At bottom level, it includes products, their hardware, 
embedded software, connectivity. In the cloud level, there is data management, servers, 
analytics and integrations with business software systems. (Juhanko et al., 2015) 
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Figure 8. Simplified IoT infrastructure 
Figure 8 presents the three layers of industrial internet infrastructure. These layers play 
plays certain roles in processing data flows. Data flow is connected with all of the layers. 
These layers basically are created when known Industrial Control Systems, the physical 
layer is brought online with broader systems. The physical layer often is applied with 
low-latency, fine grained systems without a connection to other systems. In order to con-
trol all these systems together remotely centralized data management and operations are 
needed. Physical systems are directly applied with the operations technology without try-
ing to create any further information from the sent sensor data. IIRA (Industrial Internet 
Consortium, 2015) also represents that the industrial internet is actually conjoining the 
two different kind of domains, IT and OT, with traditionally two different kind of pur-
poses and standards together. This actually demonstrates that physical systems (sensor 
layer) and the functional IT systems (cloud and application layer) can be seen as two 
ensembles coupled together. But when we are analysing the infrastructure from technical 
point of view, instead of operational point of view, three layers can be formed. 
Generally, technology and the infrastructure is not the bottleneck of creating industrial 
internet applications, but for understanding what industrial internet means, it is good to 
divide into smaller pieces. Also, many of the problems implementing industrial internet 
are between the technological levels. When going deeper from the Figure 8 a technology 
stack can be presented in more detailed. When exploring the phases of data, at the per-
ception layer nature of the information is data. In this layer networks and sensors are 
creating the technology. At network layer nature of the information is information, it 
means that the sensor data is refined in understandable for. At the network layer analytics 
and data storage is taken place as a technology. At the application layer the information 
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has business understanding and meaning. At this phase sensor data is a value-adding ser-
vice which allows new services and business. Concrete outcome of the application layer 
is digital services and different kind of applications.  
 
Figure 9. IOT Architecture 
The challenge of the infrastructure is how to manage the whole technology stack. In order 
to get the new services and business, the infrastructure should be working bottom up. 
Different service providers and technologies are implemented, figure 10 gives an example 
about the players at the IoT technology market. Big IT companies offers ease managing 
the whole infrastructure with different kind of IoT platforms. Those platforms are like a 
glue between technologies which enables data collecting, management and analytics. The 
challenge with infrastructure is also with existing IT-systems (e.g. ERP, CRM) and im-
plementing those into the IoT infrastructure. In many cases the old systems creates a 
grounding information with the new business opportunities, that’s why implementing 
these systems well is important. 
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Figure 10. The players at IoT infrastructure (Ailisto, 2015) 
When there are many different kind of players at the market and companies have to co-
operate with many different kind of technologies and implementations. Companies does 
not implement the whole infrastructure at once. Technologies are implemented step by 
step. Porter and Heppelmann (Porter & Heppelmann, 2014) introduces that technology 
stack can be implemented with four simple steps:  
• Monitoring, 
• Control 
• Optimization 
• Autonomy 
These steps look really familiar with maturity model introduced at Figure 9. But each of 
these steps builds on the preceding one. For example, if you want to have control capa-
bility, first you have to have monitoring technology. 
At the monitoring step sensors and different kind of external data sources are enabled. 
Monitoring can be sensing condition of the products or external environment, but also 
collecting operational data of the physical element. Product includes its own simple hard-
ware and software to alert ja notify. Next stage control includes software within the prod-
uct or product cloud to control the product and user personalization. At the optimization 
phase algorithms to optimize the use and operate the product are included. This is the way 
to gain product performance and run predictive maintenance. When all these three steps 
are implemented autonomous operations can be implemented. Ultimately, all products 
can function complete autonomy and products can have self-diagnosis and service. 
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2.4.1 Perception layer 
In this research prober clarification of the technological stack is started from the machine-
to-machine connections and according Porter and Heppelmann’s technological steps to-
wards high maturity of connected products. Perception layer is one of the three tiers in-
troduced by Industrial Internet Reference Architecture (Industrial Internet Consortium, 
2015). At that research perception layer is mentioned as an Edge Tier. At this layer data 
is collected with different sensors and transformed using communication networks. Sen-
sors actually are not a new invention. Before sensors were tailored for use of its target 
and the sensors were connected to circuit boards which contained embedded software. 
The IoT trend is to remove embedded intelligence from the sensors and get the physical 
systems out from local control to remote and autonomous operations. In the other hand, 
local processing of data is gaining importance. This is because when the processing is 
done near the sensor, the need of communications network is not that big and the data is 
more accessible in the cloud layer. (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016) 
At this layer two important factors have to be considered. There are various types data so 
seamless way to produce and transfer data forwards is required. And the other factor is 
selecting proper sensors by type and specification. (Porter & Heppelmann, 2014) The 
increasing volume and fall of prices of sensors actually is one of the main source of in-
dustrial internet beginning. Normally sensors are included in a variety of devices and 
solutions. Standard devices collect data from one kind of sensors for example location via 
GPS, but trend is moving towards multi-sensor elements which contains different kind on 
sensing capabilities.  
Sensor network 
Most of the sensors are passive so they just receive information. Active sensors convey 
energy to environment by themselves and are waiting for response e.g. receiving radio 
signals (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). 
Sensors are at the bottoms of the technology stack. Sensors are electrical little device 
which collects information from a physical world. Different kind of phenomena collected 
by the sensor can be physical or chemical circumstance or event. In the IoT solutions, 
sensor collects data there where it is installed. Sensor itself does not create usable infor-
mation about its target and the measuring data is usually an analogical signal which is 
transferred and converted to digital, with analog-to-digital converters. So, the analogical 
data from sensors is transferred to separate control unit or the sensor have its own control 
unit. The value is created with the flow of information and understanding and comparing 
it to the history data. Simplified this layer detects, collects and processes information from 
sensors and then transits it to the network layer. This layer can have also its own local 
and short range networks.  
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Sensor alone does not make measurable results. Like said earlier sensor environment in 
addition sensors itself are combined usually with analogy to digital converters, data col-
lections units (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). If sensor does have its own control unit there 
might also be software to filter and simplify the data collected from the sensors. Usually 
this type of set includes also some kind of power source, memory and transceivers. This 
kind of set is called as a sensor node. Like in Figure 11 can be seen sensor unit usually is 
made up with four basic components; sensing unit, power unit, a processing unit and a 
transceiver. Sensing unit usually contains two elements; sensors and above-mentioned 
analog to digital converters. After sensor data is transformed to digital in ADC it is sent 
to processing unit. Processor unit will make the sensor data compatible with other sensor 
nodes and achieve expected requirements of the sensor node. Transceiver connects node 
to the network. Power unit gives needed power to node. Many sensing tasks require in-
formation about the location and even the sensor node can be transferred. That’s why in 
Figure 11 There is locations finding system and mobilizer shown. (Akyildiz, 2002) 
 
Figure 11. Components of sensor node (Akyildiz, 2002) 
Power unit is important because the power consumption plays an important role in sen-
sor node. Sensor node can contain energy gathering elements like solar cells and even 
from environment temperature differences, but usually sensors get their energy from a 
battery. Sensors power consumption is negligibly small and can be equipped with a lim-
ited power source, and sensor node lifetime is in a strong dependence on battery life-
time. That is why power conversation and management take an importance and many 
researchers are focusing how to invent different kind of power-aware protocols and al-
gorithms (Akyildiz, 2002). All this technology is packed in smaller phase than a match 
box or even the smallest applications are about a cubic centimetre by capacity. Small 
wireless sensors are going to be most common types of sensors. In this case, the trans-
ceiver is the largest consumer of energy. The battery lifetime depends a lot from the 
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type of communications and the amount of transferred data. However, when sensor is 
connected with local Ethernet network, it can get the energy from Ethernet cable, this 
technique is known as Power-over-Ethernet. In wireless applications this is not possible, 
but in the future, it is possible to supply power through the wireless network. This tech-
nique is called as a Power over Wi-fi. 
Giving an example how sensors work in real life application. Basically, every machine 
that registers real-time data can be a sensor when it is connected to network and the data 
is processed. Car’s windshield-wiper, a rain sensor is connected to cars own network. 
(Bruner, 2013) Sensor from the windshield collects data about the infrared light and if 
there is water on the windshield the light reflects to different directions; the wetter wind-
shield is, the less light it makes for the sensor. This data is transferred now to cars oper-
ating systems. The information from that sensor is combined with the GPS sensor which 
tells the speed of the vehicle. Then the operating system can do its decision about turning 
the wipes on and on what speed. In IoT applications the information from this sensor node 
is sent to upper levels of technology stack. 
The most common sensor types gather analogical data from physical and chemical 
changes of environment. Here are some examples what different kind on phenomena can 
be measured by sensors and what different kind of sensors are out there: 
• Movements, like acceleration, speed, position, gyroscope 
• Temperature and humidity 
• Pressure of gas or liquid, surface level, flow 
• Chemical composition or feature 
• Vibration 
• Resistance, power consumption and other electronical features 
• Radiation with visible light, infra-red or ultraviolet light 
• Brightness and proximity 
• Biometrics (e.g. finger print) 
• Volume 
• Weather information like wind speed 
There are also sensor types which measures magnetic fields and other environmental 
measures. Sensor are deployed very close or directly inside the environment to be ob-
served. That is why they usually work places where there is no direct contact available, 
they can work inside a larger machine or even in the bottom of the ocean (Akyildiz, 2002). 
Combining different kind of sensors, the machine can be controlled in different ways. It 
is good to remember that a machine and the entity created by them is usually equipped 
with multiple sensors with variable mission. 
Machine-to-machine telecommunications networks 
23 
The data produced by the sensor must be transferred for upper levels of IoT infrastructure 
and the next base is data management level which means that data is transferred to cloud. 
There is straight way from the sensors to cloud, but challenging is that there are many 
different kind of technologies and topologies. When there are multiple options to con-
struct the network using different standards or protocols, there must be clear decisions 
what is the way create the communications (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). In practise the 
goals would be to minimize the used technologies, but when the ensembles are big and 
use of the sensors and environments are different, there are often used many different 
kinds of technologies. Also, when thinking that there are many factories from different 
eras implemented, the IoT networks can be really complex and thus they are difficult to 
control, maintain and coordinate. 
New technologies allow different kind of efficient technologies used in IoT communica-
tions networks. Gartner’s IT Hype Cycle (Fenn, 2011), measured by the Google search 
activity, presents impressive hype with terms like Wireless Sensor Networks, Machine-
to-Macine Communication Services, Wireless Power and Mesh Networks. Basically, this 
means that IoT technology will be taken place with environment around us and sensor 
networks are somewhere in the centre of making this possible. When WiFi and 4G wire-
less Internet access presence is growing the evolution to ubiquitous IoT networks is clear 
(Gubbi et al., 2012). Wireless networks are wide spreading sharply, because it is so much 
easier and faster to expand the networks of them. Also decrease of the price of wireless 
technology accelerates the expansion.  Saarelainen (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016) also says 
that noted perspective in networks is the size and need for change. Integrating capability 
sensors with different kind of network technologies is important part of taking technolog-
ical leaps with IoT development. 
Few principals should consider while designing a network for the sensors (Akyildiz, 
2002): 
• Power efficiency is in an important role 
• Sensor networks are data-centric 
• Data aggregation is useful only when it does not hinder the collaborative effort of 
sensors 
• Attribute based-addressing and location awareness should be deployed (Akyildiz, 
2002) 
From the technical point of view sensor networks can be divided on general term in wired 
and wireless networks. These networks can be divided into three different coverage areas. 
These three technics, which you can see in Figure 12, are telling about the geographical 
dimensions of the network. 
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Figure 12.  Three dimensions of networks (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016) 
PAN/WPAN technology (Personal Area Network/Wireless PAN) means personal wire-
less network, where usually most common terminal is personal smart phone and the most 
common network technique is Bluetooth (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). Range of the net-
work is usually from a few meters to one hundred meters and data speed is under one 
megabit for a second. Despite that PAN networks are called personal, technique is also 
used in industrial internet applications, where PAN-network is usable in many environ-
ments, if there is router nearby. Bluetooth technique requires just little energy. Small 
Bluetooth Low Energy circuits consumes only a little power and they are really inexpen-
sive. Weakness of the Bluetooth technology is short range and the other weakness is net-
work topology model, where data from the sensors are gathered in one hub (Saarelainen 
& Collin, 2016). RFID technology was a breakthrough which allows wireless data com-
munication (Gubbi et al., 2012). RFID means radio frequency identification and it allows 
individual identifications with radio signal. That is how it enables every machine to have 
their own identity which is formed differently than ip-based identification. Rfid-technol-
ogy is suitable for use that big number of pieces goes through observation points, this is 
why this technology is used in logistics and warehouses. Nfc (near-field communications) 
technology is wireless radio technology similar with Rfid. Signal range is only few cen-
timetres and that’s why there is no big IoT applications. 802.15.4 radio standards are 
suitable with building automation, industrial monitoring and application controlling 
(Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). With that standard, there are three technologies used in 
industrial internet applications; ZibBee 6LoWPAN and WirelessHART&ISA100.11a. 
ZigBee specially is the first real standard solution for IoT applications. ZigBee is a wire-
less language that everyday devices use to connect to another (ZigBee, 2017). ZigBee 
networks can contain up to 65 000 devices and connecting to network lasts around 30ms. 
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Maximum range is about 100 meters. Problems with ZigBee is slow communications, 
connection instability and security vulnerabilities (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). 
LAN/WLAN (Local Area Network/Wireless LAN) is a standard network which can be 
wired or wireless. Range can usually be hundreds of meters wired and 100 meters’ wire-
less. Industrial Ethernet is specially for industrial devices to connect. Industrial Ethernet 
is based on the same Ethernet standards and protocols that used in normal Ethernet appli-
cations. So, it can be connected with traditional IT world pretty easily. Of course, indus-
trial Ethernet equipment is made for industrial environments and that is why it differs 
from traditional office equipment. Powerline also known as PLC (Power Line Commu-
nications) is transferring data in power lines instead of Ethernet cables. Technique is used 
widely in energy sector, but can be used also in manufactories and buildings. This is a 
quick way to create connections there where power supply is installed and where Ethernet 
is not meaningful to build. WLAN also known as Wi-Fi is fast and based on Ethernet 
technology. There is more progressive version for Wi-Fi in IoT applications and it is 
called WiFi HaLow which is developed for IoT and M2M use. Low power consumption 
and permeability of structures are taken into account. (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016) 
WAN/WWAN (Wire Area Network / Wireless WAN) is a wide range network which is 
also easily known as Internet. This network technique allows really fast communications. 
Up to hundreds of megabytes in a second. At the centre of this dimensions are 4G and 5G 
networks. In Finland Tekes (Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation) 
support 5G network development in addition with Industrial Internet development 
(Juhanko et al., 2015). Main goal is to focus to create groundings for business with han-
dling and transferring a lot of information with real-time and uses it with machine-to-
machine communications. 4G technology is becoming a strong option with the industrial 
internet and 5G technology is forecasted to come in use in the year 2020 (Saarelainen & 
Collin, 2016). Developed standard for IoT use with 4G technologies are LTE-M, Nar-
rowBand IoT (NB-IOT) and NarrowBand LTE (NB-LTE). LTE-M standard is created 
for machine to machine communications and it is fully compatible with 4G/LTE network. 
NarrowBand IoT has been specially developed for narrow bandwidth use and is so very 
low with power consumption. NarrowBand LTE standard is also very low with power 
consumption but network suppliers are trying to create the technology as cheap as possi-
ble. 5G technology is clearly future and it is developed for the growing needs of commu-
nications networks with IoT and for overall large data streams. The goal of 5G technology 
is to offer at least ten-year battery lifetime and offer very short latency time.  
Network architecture and topology is also vital part of successful communications be-
tween sensors and cloud. Also, this is very important for information security. All the 
sensor data is not smart to transfer raw from sensors to cloud platform. Separating mean-
ingful data from all data flows collected to send for cloud platform is important. Usually 
this is handled with creating a gateway-mediated connectivity (Figure 13)  
26 
 
Figure 13. Gateway-mediated connectivity and pattern (Industrial Internet Consortium, 
2015) 
Gateway-mediated network means that local network is centralized to one or more hub 
before data is transferred further. The gateway acts as an endpoint from wide area network 
view and isolates the local area network from the outside. This allows localizing some 
operations and control, usually gateway is a computer and it uses software to filter and 
analyse sensor data. Gateway enables to reduce communications traffic and act as an in-
tegrator with different sensor and actuator technologies used in local area network. The 
local network can use different topologies. In a hub-and-spoke topology hub has a direct 
connection with each LAN nodes. In a mesh-network topology hub acts as a cluster for 
different nodes which can have their own routing capability. This allows sensing layer to 
be very dynamic. So, sensors usually are not directly accessible from the wide area net-
work. Gateway is an entry point for sensors and provides routing and address translation. 
Sensor network updates and site-specific decisions can also be done with gateway com-
puter, this allows to do local changes in topology and e.g. add extra sensing technology 
for the local area network. Then the updates don’t have to strain upper technology layers. 
2.4.2 Data management and analytics 
Figure 9 shows that data management and analytics happens in network layer. This sec-
tion was named as data management and analytics because network layer as a nomination 
can be easily messed up with sensor network layer. Basically, when sensor data is col-
lected together from different sites and sensor count is increasing, sensors cannot be easily 
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anymore managed from the sensing layer. Data volume eventually exceed the threshold 
that different kind of data storages and analytics platforms may be considered to imple-
ment (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015). Centralized data collection enables to create 
business adding value when analytics is implemented in top of that. When data is created 
from different sources, internal and external it is vital to be able to analyse all this data at 
the same place (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). The data have to be stored and used intelli-
gently for smart monitoring and actuation; storage, ownership and expiry of the data is 
becoming important when implementing this phase (Gubbi et al., 2012). Cloud based 
services and technology means that real-time internet based communications. It usually 
offers a platform for data storage and service provider software, analytics and applications 
can be used in top of the storage data (Juhanko et al., 2015). Porter & Heppelmann (2015) 
refers that sensor data is transferred into product data base. This database enables aggre-
gation, normalization and management of real-time and historical product data. With dif-
ferent kind of integration external information sources (e.g. information about weather, 
traffic, social media and energy prices) and business systems (e.g. information from ERP, 
CRM and PLM) is integrated with the database. Storage technology is not a new thing, 
in the third industrial revolutions when IT was taking place with Industrial Information 
Systems there were organisations own private storages or data centres. But today when 
the goal is that the whole supply chain and stakeholders can exploit the value of data and 
when the cloud storage price has dropped, it is inherent that cloud storage is implemented. 
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory has identified some major challenges in data management 
and analytics (Jones et al., 2012). High volume and low power consumption will create 
challenges for implementing IoT architectures, machine learning techniques or real-time 
data analyse and the design of scalable data storages. These challenges guides for more 
detailed framework how the data management and analytics can be implemented. 
Data management 
Traditional data management systems normally operate with storage, possible retrieval 
and updates. In IoT data management, systems are in additional collecting data in real-
time, do logging and has to have some kind of facilities for offline analysis (Abu-Elkheir 
et al., 2013). This expands the concept of data management in IoT systems. IoT can have 
various number of data sources. The total amount of data generated will grow exponen-
tially and this will set challenges and requirements for IoT data management. The volume 
of the data is increasing and at the same time verity and velocity is rising. IoT data can 
include different elements like text, video, audio etc. When the amount of data is increas-
ing, it requires good design from the data storage and management. When scalable data 
storages are implemented providing efficient data mining and the there has to be a choose 
where to process data; remotely or locally where the data is stored.  
The type of the data storage enables how the data management is scaling. Normally data 
storages are consisting of databases, but when considering different databases, it should 
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not hinder processing of data, it should make data processing more efficient. Three most 
used databases are MySQL, Oracle and Microsoft SQL Server (Saarelainen & Collin, 
2016). Those all database types follow structured query language, SQL. SQL requires 
that the data structure is predetermined. With big data masses, normal SQL database is 
not so scalable and it is getting slower. NoSQL database (non-structural database) is more 
flexible and scalable than the traditional SQL database. In NoSQL server, different kind 
of structured and non-structured data (photos, videos, sensor data etc.) can be saved. 
NoSQL databases are actually a starting point for big data platforms. NoSQL database is 
a good choice for big IoT database, because IoT data is less or more unstructured and the 
amount of data is huge. 
Big data as term indicated means big mass of data. Most known big data platform is called 
Hadoop. Hadoop is a decentralized storage system and the server which are creating the 
cluster. There is a separate disk systems, which split the incoming data around the cluster. 
IoT will be one of the main sources of big data and the cloud is the place where it is 
possible to store it and perform complex analyses on it. 
In Figure 14 high level cloud architecture can be seen. Firstly, at the bottom of the cloud 
are the physical storages which are incorporated with different kind of virtual machines. 
Virtualization is enables physical machine to function as a set of different virtual ma-
chines (Buyya et al., 2009). SLA, service level agreement, refers to the properties how 
the cloud service is delivered for the client. SLA is a set of resource management strate-
gies to personalize the service for example pricing, usage, access and trust.  
Data management layer includes lots of integrations. First integration happens when the 
sensor data is integrated into cloud. This data can be structured or un-structured. But in 
order to get clear the data there must be integrations to analytics and operations. In the 
Figure 14, data transform represents different kind of integrations in the data management 
layer, analytics and when the information is transferred and visualized for the business 
use. Good to also notice that external data sources need integrations to get effectively 
integrated with the sensor data at the data management layer. 
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Figure 14. High level cloud architecture (Chen et al., 2014;  Buyya et al., 2009) 
There are different kind of types how the cloud is executed with companies. Cloud com-
puter can be harnessed with SaaS (Software as a service), PaaS (Platform as a service), 
IaaS (Infrastructure as a service), Public Cloud (storage operated and owned by the com-
pany and giving access over a public network), Private Cloud (entitled users only have 
access for company owned storage) and Hybrid Cloud (private cloud with public cloud 
access) (Meola, 2016). Choosing the right cloud platform depends of the needs of the 
company, different kind of attributes can be e.g. integrations, 3rd party accesses, amount 
of data, analytical capabilities and security. Benefits of cloud technology is low cost stor-
age and automatic scalability for millions different kind of data flows. There are specific 
cloud services for Industrial Internet which in addition of data storage offers also device 
management and analytical tools (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). 
Data storage architecture is also a crucial part how to management different kind of data 
flows. Basically, there are two options; centralized or distributed architecture. Centralized 
architecture collects data into one background system where all the device management 
and centralized services are built. In this architecture end points are not in direct contact 
with each other.  In this architecture device management, integrations and analytics are 
take place from one place. But when the IoT architecture is growing and developing dis-
tributed architecture will be introduced when end points are enabled to connect with each 
other. This allows that some of the processing can be done without burdening the main 
system and latency is minimalized when some actions are happened near the end points. 
(Saarelainen & Collin, 2016) 
Analytics 
30 
Analytics answers to the question what kind of information supports the company’s de-
cision-making process and bring value to the business. There are three types of data to 
generate; history data, real-time data and predictions. Analytics is a model to find patterns 
from the history and real-time data and use them to make predictions or actions. Analytics 
can be implemented as from simple rule-based decision making to artificial intelligence. 
It was mentioned earlier, there can be decision making processes already close to sensors. 
Those can be set to operate in order fine-tune machines automatically. When talking about 
the analytics we are focusing intelligence above the data management level. Even if there 
are some processing power near the sensor, all the data, alarms and communications are 
happening through the analytics platform. 
Analytics is not a process that companies just implement into their IoT project and then 
it is giving results. Analytics is more like learning path. Companies can test hypotheses 
with it and slowly learn the systematic analytics after iterating and combined it with ex-
ternal data (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). IoT stakeholders says (Dimensional Research, 
2015) that challenges in data analysis is that there is too much data to analyse effectively 
and the analysis capabilities are not flexible enough to analyse effectively. Secondly, in 
acting on analysis IoT stakeholders have recognized these challenges; data is analysed 
too slowly to be actionable, we’re not sure questions to ask and business processes are 
too rigid to allow us to act on the analysis (Dimensional Research, 2015). Analytics seems 
to lack the effectiveness to make more meaningful and faster decisions with IoT analytics. 
Analytics can be implemented in various levels by its difficulty and know-how. The base 
for analytics is creating algorithms. Data scientists and analysts might have to code algo-
rithms by themselves using e.g. R, MapReduce or Python programming languages 
(Saarelainen & Collin, 2016). Today there are also commercial tools straight to imple-
ment into use using different kind of cloud IoT platforms. Focus from the programming 
skills is moving towards asking the right kind of business questions from the analytics. 
Still analytics is lacking the shortage of talent to take advantage out of big data. McKinsey 
predicts (Manyika et al., 2011) that United States alone will face shortage of 140,000 to 
190,000 people with analytical skills by 2018 and also there will be 1.5 million managers 
without knowledge and understanding the capabilities of big data analytics. 
Analytics can be implemented in different kind of algorithms and level of difficulty. From 
easier analytics to difficult, analytics can be divided into four different kind of levels 
(Attick, 2016): 
1. Rule-based decision making 
2. Statistical reasoning 
3. Machine learning 
4. Artificial intelligence 
31 
Rule-based decision making and statistical reasoning is something that every programmer 
can do. Rule-based reasoning is used e.g. in notifications, alarms and simple pattern 
matching. It can be put into service using Boolean algorithms. Ruled-based decision mak-
ing is more descriptive analytics, it tells what happened, gives alarms and reports. Statis-
tical reasoning uses numerical data and does simple regression. With statistical reasoning, 
predictive maintenance, data mining and extra- and interpolation can be done and it is 
more like diagnostic analytics. Rule-based decision making and statistical reasoning can 
be done by normal programmer. Machine learning goes deep into predictive analytics; it 
gives forecasts and simulations. In machine learning arbitrary data is abstracted into num-
bers; relevant features can be identified from large amount of data and the use of different 
kind of quality controls. Machine learning is usually contributed by data scientists, but 
there could be also more complex implementations which needs different kind of special-
ists. Machine learning means basically that machines can learn automatically from their 
environment and themselves, this allows them to automatically to predict. Artificial in-
telligence is autonomous selection of best methodology when presented with arbitrary 
data. Artificial intelligence optimises and plans how to do tasks; it can have human-like 
conversational skills and think like a digital assistant. Machine learning and artificial in-
telligence needs big amounts of data to work correctly. (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016; 
Attick, 2016) 
Industrial internet analytics gives integration for the business applications. Also, company 
can use their existing tools to visualize the analytics data. Many of today’s applications 
includes different kind of dashboards, with good visualization applications IoT analytics 
can also be more descriptive. 
2.4.3 Application layer 
IoT architecture (Figure 9) describes that application layer is formed by 3rd party cloud 
connections and APIs (Application programming interface). These can be created when 
the whole technology stack is created under it. In this application layer, stakeholders can 
measure out the benefits of the industrial internet implementation. Applications repre-
sents different collection of functions which are reflected to certain business functions. 
Simplified, application layer provides global management of the application based on the 
information produced in the cloud layer and analytics (Khan et al., 2012). With applica-
tions stakeholders are able to do high level optimization and decisions. Individual ma-
chine controlling is mostly happened already at the lower level of industrial internet ar-
chitecture. Industry applications can be for example management of fleet of devices. IoT 
also can help to monitor the environmental performance and process data to identify ma-
chines that need maintenance (Khan et al., 2012). 
IIRA (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015) refers that application domain is divided into 
two pieces: 
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• Logic and rules are set of variations which are creating the construct and content 
for the applications. 
• APIs and UI presents the interfaces of the applications. With APIs relevant data 
is collected and UI is interaction between human and application. 
The new business is created when these applications are combined with existing business 
applications like ERP, CRM, etc. This way the industrial company enables end-to-end 
operations from the business applications to Industrial Internet System (Industrial Internet 
Consortium, 2015). The business layer is responsible for the management of Industrial 
Internet and it build business models, graphs and flowcharts. Based on that information 
future actions and business strategies are determined. 
With Industrial Internet applications masses are not reached. This is because many of the 
IoT devices are created e.g. for the consumer business. Then there are many users for the 
applications, but Industrial Internet applications are used mainly by the companies them-
selves and defined stakeholders (Lueth, 2015).  
When creating applications for Industrial Internet, modern agile software development 
models are introduced. This is the place where small software development company 
methods are implemented. This means that the basic waterfall model of the software de-
velopment is not working when pioneering applications are produced. Fail fast -mentality 
and minimum viable product -method is implemented. With this development stiff and 
big industrial companies should mutate into agile software houses. Co-operating with 3rd 
party software developers is vital and the cultural change can happen. 
Applications and the business support they are creating are actually bonding the Industrial 
Internet System with business. In this phase, new business models and services are cre-
ated. This means that customers can have additional ways of using the products, e.g. pay-
per-use and manufacturer can offer additional services like predictive maintenance. Ser-
vices should be always targeted with certain user groups by their profile, use and pricing. 
There are many thing manufacturing companies have to consider while creating different 
kind of applications and services. Seppälä et. al. (Seppälä et al., 2014) presents that digital 
services includes four basic features which are introduced in following table: 
Table 3. Features of Industrial Internet application (Seppälä et al., 2014; Saarelainen & 
Collin, 2016) 
Feature Explanation 
Real-time  
operation 
This means that collected data can be analysed and change into 
meaningful information in real-time. With old-dated information it 
is impossible to make good business decisions. 
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Predictability 
With analytics and machine learning companies can perform pre-
dictive maintenance and environmental changes. Digital services 
should be able to predictive different kind of changes. 
Mobility 
Mobility is basically a starting point for all the digital applications 
today. People are accustomed for using mobile devices and ser-
vices. Mobility allows to use industrial internet applications from 
all over the world any time. 
Automation 
One of the Industrial Internet System goal is that there are ways to 
make smoother processes and delete manual work. Automation im-
proves the efficiency of processes. 
 
Finding unique added value from the industrial internet systems is the main thing that 
creates competitive advantage. Well created applications can also shape the organisa-
tional culture and business model. This comes when the company is changing into more 
diverse and agile business environment. Also, there are people with different kind of 
background involved into projects and development. Manufacturing companies should 
always thing how to make this kind of switch in the culture for their advantage. 
 
34 
3. INDUSTRIAL INTERNET INFORMATION SECU-
RITY RISK ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION METH-
ODS 
 When industrial systems are connected into IP world, it means that new kind of threats 
are established. Aalto University research about open industrial devices found in Shodan 
tells its brutal story (Tiilikainen & Manner, 2013). Shodan is an online search for devices 
which are open to outside. The research found almost three thousand open devices. In the 
third industrial revolution, these kinds of concerns were not important because the devices 
where not connected to outside world. But now those same old systems are connected to 
networks and the information security concerns are not considered.  
Information security should be implemented and planned together with the other IoT de-
velopment. All security work starts from the understand of own networks and devices. 
Factories can be stacked with different kind of networks and layers of technology. Also, 
different stakeholders e.g. clients are unlikely to adopt different industrial internet solu-
tions if the security, confidentiality, authentications and privacy are not guaranteed. 
3.1 Information security goals 
Like said, there are huge number of different kind of active or passive devices included 
in industrial internet system. Information security has been before more about computer 
systems, software applications and IT infrastructure, now there are devices and plant in-
cluded. The information security beyond company lines, because different kind of inter-
faces are offered for the stakeholders. This is why sealing the whole systems is not suita-
ble. Hacker are trying to find open and unprotected devices, after that they are trying to 
go through the authentication layer by inventing username and password. The other way 
is to get to read or manipulate control commands. This is possible when unencrypted 
communication is used. Also, hackers are trying to use the security vulnerabilities of the 
network devices like routers and firewalls. (Telekom, 2016) 
Industrial Internet Reference Architecture (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015) intro-
duces that information security must be appointed as an end-to-end process. In this oper-
ational system both information technology, operational technology and their subsystems 
must be secured and also situation awareness should be implemented. In order to build a 
comprehensive security for industrial internet system, these are the main approaches (In-
dustrial Internet Consortium, 2015): 
• Endpoint security 
• Communication security 
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• Management and monitoring of the security 
• Data distribution and secure storage 
Babar et. al. (Babar et al., 2010) appointed that in order to tackle security, privacy and 
trust in devices and with information high level IoT security requirements are following: 
• Secure storage 
• Tamper resistant 
• Secure s/w execution 
• Secure content 
• Secure network access 
• Availability 
• Secure data communications 
• Identity management 
These approaches are more specifically opened when security architecture is investigated. 
Some general components must be implemented when thinking about the overall infor-
mation security in companies’ industrial internet architecture. Miorandi et. al. (Miorandi 
et al., 2012) have identified three key issues which are represented in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. Security challenges in IoT (Miorandi et al., 2012) 
Data confidentiality means that authorized entitles and accesses are guaranteed. This is 
important because data can include business confidential information. Defining an access 
control mechanism helps to keep track about the users. Data confidentiality is also con-
sidered when 3rd party data streams are implemented into own applications and big data 
(Miorandi et al., 2012).  So, confidentiality guarantees that information is not disclosed 
to unauthorized stakeholders. The purpose of confidentiality is to ensure that data transfer 
between nodes is not accessed or understood by any other party. This kind of confidenti-
ality is usually achieved by access and identity systems, but more specifically using key 
cryptography where sender and receiver are using a shared key. Confidentiality should be 
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also an autonomic process, because a big deal of the events is happened automatically 
(Mamoon & Habaebi, 2015). Data integrity is also a part of data confidentiality. Integrity 
means inability of modification of information somewhere in data transfer. This can be 
prevented by using cryptography and checksum or message integrity code.  
Privacy defines the rules how the data is accessed and shown for the users. Privacy in this 
context should not be mixed with European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
(European Comission, 2015) which means how the personal data is processes and stored. 
In Industrial internet applications, personal data is not usually stored. Of course, this is 
something to consider in consumer IoT applications, but it is outside of this research 
scope. In the IoT systems it is important that information privacy goals are achieved. This 
can be fulfilled with e.g. with different kind of technologies which enables secure use of 
data or data provider is able to observe how and what different users are using the system 
and data (Weber, 2010). Many of these privacy challenges only are suitable in the appli-
cation level of industrial internet architecture. Privacy is mainly defined in very high level 
of abstraction; this is because privacy can be different in different kind of systems. Pri-
vacy guarantees how the users are able to see the data; is it somehow limited or blocked. 
In the other hand, it is important that in the systems different users are not able to see how 
the other users are using the data (Mamoon & Habaebi, 2015). Wireless channels increase 
the risk of violating privacy e.g. by eavesdropping and masking attacks. This is regulated 
by the law when personal data is collected, but in the industrial environments privacy is 
taking into account when thinking corporate espionage and frauds. Privacy is defined by 
generated privacy models and enforcements models. Also, it should be taken into account 
what information and to whom it is shown for the users (Miorandi et al., 2012). 
Trust is the third security challenge according the Figure 15. It also has many different 
definitions and it is understood depending on the context. Trust refers to the process where 
required service is allowed from party to another with obtaining the service. It can be 
explained like a maintenance of technologies like mobile network is offered to consum-
ers; it relies on working the communications between peers. Many of the trust require-
ments are met with a reliable identity management and access control, where users can 
straight get from application to the IoT domain (Miorandi et al., 2012). In this kind of 
environment where there are many stakeholders included, trust is of course met by beliefs, 
delegation, credentials, recommendation and reputation (Babar et al., 2010). Babar et. al. 
(Babar et al., 2010) has also pointed this issues with the proposed security model for IoT 
(Figure 16). 
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Figure 16. Security framework for IoT 
These three dimensions of the cube shows the intersection. Privacy includes laws, ethical, 
user privacy, owner privacy and respondent privacy. Security therefore includes authori-
sation, identification and authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and 
availability. The cube describes the high level of interconnectedness between things, ser-
vices and people. Every information and access in the IoT architecture should be address 
via privacy, security and trust. (Babar et al., 2010) 
Industrial Internet architecture exposes a lot of surface for malicious attacks. Attack sur-
face are physical layer with devices and electronics, but human, network and software 
(Cam-Winget, Sadeghi, & Jin, 2016). When the IoT system get larger, attack surface also 
increases and it will be harder to maintain. The technology is developing all the time and 
new ways of communications and systems are invented. This sets challenges to reach the 
goals with information security when old technology and structures are mixed with old 
ones. 
3.2 Industrial Internet security architecture 
Like presented before, IoT primarily operates on three layers which are perception, net-
work and application layer. Each layer of IoT has inherent security issues due the tech-
nologies used. In this section information security threats, techniques and technologies 
are presented in relation to the IoT architecture. Some of the threats and techniques can 
be repeated in different layers, so it is smart to clarify threats compared to IoT architec-
ture. Threat taxonomy is presented in Figure 17. The list of the threats and measures to 
tackle these threats are described more specifically when going deeper to the security 
architecture in this chapter. 
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Figure 17. IoT architecture threat taxonomy. (Mamoon & Habaebi, 2015; Babar et al., 
2010; Mahalle et al., 2013) 
In the other hand security challenges of the IoT can be also broadly divided into two 
classes; technological and security challenges (Yousuf et al., 2015). Technological chal-
lenges are related to wireless technologies, scalability, energy and distribution of IoT. 
Security challenges are in this breakdown considered as the challenges related to security 
services like authentication, privacy, trustworthiness, end-to-end security etc. This is 
good to remember while planning the security for the IoT. The security is not only about 
the security services and technologies, security in the IoT is also about the used IoT tech-
nologies and the architecture of the whole system. For example, where the memory and 
processing is taken place, which wireless connections is used and how the technology 
stacked is scaled between the layers and other devices. Also, Ashraf et. al. (Mamoon & 
Habaebi, 2015) describes that security constraints are higher at the perception layer and 
are getting lower in higher levels of the architecture.  
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3.2.1 Perception and network layer security 
In industrial internet applications, the biggest attack surface is in perception layer. There 
can be huge amounts of different kind of devices and networks, which can be geograph-
ically remote. Complex is also that some of the devices can be old and are usually tried 
to implement as cheaply as possible. Also, many of the IoT devices do not have appro-
priate user interfaces and communications to pair with the older technologies. 
International Journal for Information Security Research (Yousuf et al., 2015) describes 
that there are three main security issues in IoT perception layer; strength of wireless sig-
nals, physical attacks and dynamic IoT topology. Signals are usually transmitted in per-
ception layer via sensor nodes used different kind of wireless technologies and it can be 
compromised by using disturbing methods like different radio frequencies. Sensors are 
microprocessors are also prone for physical attacks because they are usually external and 
located outdoor environments and attacker can tamper the hardware components of the 
device. Data tampering occurs when attacker modifies, adds or erases data from the end 
device. This happened when node is physically captured from the network. Attacker can 
be able to reprogram, redeploy and recover devices when the attacker has studied the type 
and format of the data transferred in IoT devices. Tampering can be prevented with auto-
nomic scenes for self-protecting and device authentication. But also, a hardware design 
of the device and secured physical design can give tampering resistance. (Industrial 
Internet Consortium, 2015; Mamoon & Habaebi, 2015) In addition to tamper-resistant 
hardware and device authentication, sensor networks must be created resilient. This can 
be done e.g. with resilient routing protocols and then the system is able to work even if 
some of the nodes are under malicious attack (Chan & Perrig, 2003). Attackers can also 
obtain their own commodity sensor nodes and include the network accept their additional 
nodes. When attackers have control of some nodes they can easily distort sensor data, 
extract private information and even enable denial of service.  
Jamming is one of the usual attack types in the perception layer. Jamming based attacks 
are really high threat in IoT because devices are usually remote and connected wireless. 
Jamming means that radio frequencies are disturbed by use of interference or saturated 
with other signals which are effecting to the right signals (Mamoon & Habaebi, 2015). 
Jamming can be mitigated and prevented by proper monitoring; sniffing details about the 
wireless information and changes. Jamming the channels can cause Denial of Service 
(DoS), when the wireless communications network is under targeted attack e.g. by jam-
ming the channels (Roman et al., 2013). Exhaustion and collision are really close to jam-
ming. In collision, the attacker forecasts message transfer timing and then the attacker 
sends the message at the same time with the right message and it will result the collision 
of the message. In bigger infrastructure, simultaneous attack messages can cause random 
harm, when the message collides with random packet transfers (Mamoon & Habaebi, 
2015). Collision can be prevented and noted same way than jamming, but autonomic sys-
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tem recovery of the systems can variable packet timings and help to prevent further dam-
age. Exhaustion means that many of the sensor layer node power are dependent on long 
life batteries. When the sensors are attacked by mentioned ways it will exhaust the bat-
teries, because attack prevent mechanisms have caused a lot activity and stress for the 
sensors. Use of cognitive adaptions and use of timers and limitations will enable also with 
availability. 
Deactivation of the sensor means that it is taken away by some malicious application or 
physical attack. Sensor can be found and destroyed or attacker will try to find a way for 
the interface. This can be prevented roughly by password protection or using camouflage. 
It is not so easy to recover from the physical attacks, but if the deactivation is done by 
application, node can be restored by commands (Mamoon & Habaebi, 2015). Controlling 
also means taking over an IoT device and after the attacker can do desired vandalism with 
it. In these cases, it is important to have a proper monitoring for the IoT devices, which 
alerts about lost nodes and performs self-healing processes. In this kind of monitoring, if 
the system identifies any kind of suspicious traffic in the sensor it may instruct to delete 
any information from the microprocessors and what is stored in the device. This will also 
help that it cannot be reverse-engineered. Reverse-engineering means that by investing 
the device you are able to understand the logic of the device and use the information 
against the system. 
In de-synchronization and replay attacker will collect the transferred data and then sent it 
repeatedly for the end-point. Replay attack is also one of the easiest attacks to perform. 
Many authentication systems are immune for this kind of attack, but it can be easily pre-
vented by encryption of the messages with dynamically changing session key. (Mamoon 
& Habaebi, 2015) 
In wireless sensor networks, attacker can have an access to private sensor information by 
monitoring node transfers (Chan & Perrig, 2003). This is called eavesdropping, but also 
can be called node capture. Eavesdropping can happen in various communication chan-
nels, like wireless networks, local networks and Internet, sot it is not just a threat in per-
ception layer. Eavesdropping is really easy to execute by internal attacker who is able to 
access the infrastructure (Roman et al. , 2013). External eavesdropping can be prevented 
by encrypting sensors, with end-to-end encryption. 
DoS attack is often mentioned when talking about attacks to IoT devices. DoS attacks can 
exhaust the service provider network bandwidth and other resources. In DoS attack, at-
tacker can take control part of the infrastructure physically or disturb it other ways e.g. 
by manipulation and delays. DoS attack can also occur inside of the sensor network if 
attackers can compromise sensor nodes. Then attackers can e.g. create routing loops 
which eventually exhaust part of the infrastructure. DoS attack can be prevented by the 
techniques that are also used towards other kind of attacks at the perception layer. This 
can be e.g. spread-spectrum communications and frequency hopping towards jamming, 
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authentication so any message cannot be accepted. Message authentication can be built 
by using e.g. signatures based on asymmetric cryptography so the protocol itself cannot 
be energy exhausted.  (Mamoon & Habaebi, 2015; Roman et al. , 2013) 
As mentioned, large number of IoT devices exposes the system for attacks. First thing to 
prevent these from happening is to ensure the basic security of the software, infrastruc-
tures, applications and computer systems. Companies must know what devices and soft-
ware there is and how they are connected. Also, it is important to understand what kind 
of information is. Then company can create a risk overview from their IoT devices. Used 
devices, communications technology and techniques should be measured in order to find 
old devices and techniques prone to attacks. Hardening for the devices and networks 
should also be done; adding extra layers of security, switch default passwords, authenti-
cations etc. 
IoT systems are created by using components from multiple vendors and with different 
levels of security. In order to create security to this kind of technology stack, it must be 
built by design rather than bring it in afterwards. To create security by design it requires 
a precise overview about endpoints, communications, endpoint management and data 
storing. This must be always analysed towards cost aspects, future implementations and 
development, security functions and possible customer requirements. Endpoint security 
actually is a lot dependent on the interface they expose. Many of the security functions 
can be implemented to work autonomous to accomplish required security policies. As we 
went through earlier, there are many different ways to attack to endpoints, so there has to 
be also many ways to secure the endpoints. For the endpoint security IIRA (Industrial 
Internet Consortium, 2015) list for endpoint security is applied present.  
Secure boot attestation means that a prescribed sequence of steps is used to restart end-
point from a known secure state. If the endpoint boot sequence is altered, security agent 
should be able to stop or guarantee the endpoint. Security agent can be either process-, 
container-, virtualization- or gateway-based. Process-based security agent means similar 
agent operations as anti-virus application are working. Container-based security agent can 
be implement straight to the endpoint including some storage and software. Virtualiza-
tion-based security agent can gain visibility of the bigger environment that just one end-
point due virtualization. Thus, it is able to control multiple security activities like embed-
ded identity, secure boot attestation, communications etc. Gateway-based security agent 
is physically really close to device and is used in the cases when security cannot be em-
bedded for the device. Then gateway-based security agent itself takes role in security 
functions. (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015) 
Every endpoint must have a unique identity so they can be managed and tracked. End-
point has unique identities e.g. IP address or MAC address, but they can be easily altered 
it they are not secured. Created unique identity code can be secured by given credentials. 
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This kind of credentials can be gain by using cryptographic keys which are secured by 
the hardware. 
When the endpoint is attacked, it should defend itself and also be able to report the attack 
further and reconfigure itself. The same security management system which is able re-
motely and automatically update endpoint, should be able to gain the knowledge about 
the endpoint attack. It is important than when one endpoint is attacked, other endpoints 
cannot be compromised. In order to recognize the attack, endpoint must work together 
with security monitoring and its analysis. When attack is recognized, security monitoring 
and management system should reduce the risk and bring the system back to the steady 
state according the policy. Policy is embedded with the central security management sys-
tem and it is spread for the use of security agents. (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015) 
Security monitoring should also gain information about the events occurring at the end-
point like updates, log in/out information, violation and authentications. When log man-
agement is done, all the information should be also stored. In the fear of possible attacks, 
log management information should also be stored in secure location like cloud and not 
only locally. (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015) 
There should be also mechanisms at the endpoints that only authorized applications and 
networks so any other is not able to connect directly with the device. This is called white-
listing. From the security management system, it should be able to change the policy 
about whitelisted networks and applications. Opposite whitelisting is blacklisting, it 
means that security policy has set some applications or networks not to contact. All these 
attempts and connections collects information for the log management system. (Industrial 
Internet Consortium, 2015) 
When inspecting more deeper communications between the devices there are more things 
to consider that just technology. E.g. how to build network topology and architecture 
which prevent possible attacks spreading and multiply. Weak network topology is a pos-
sible source for security vulnerability. Attacker can also try to create false routes, and the 
data is transferred through bad route e.g. through attackers own device. (Lu, 2014) The 
devices are connected with each other directly or through gateways and there might be 
also great heterogeneity between different technologies. This poses challenges of main-
tain communications between devices. In the IoT architecture there can be devices from 
different organizations. This sets challenges and attributes from the network access man-
agement. Also, the performance of the network should be considered before setting up 
security protocols; network latency and throughput should be at the good level (Industrial 
Internet Consortium, 2015). In the creation of the network architectures, it is good to 
consider which layers and parts to protect and how to protect them.  
When devices are creating connections between each other at the perception layer, two-
way authentication can be implemented. This way sending device can ensure that the 
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information is not only sent to the device which is receiving the data. It is also good to 
consider that communications type and what data record to share with who and under 
what condition.  
One thing what is highlighted, in addition to device authentication, is encryption. Data 
exchange between endpoints must be encrypted with cryptographic keys. In Encryption, 
key management is important to create effective and agile. Good encryption mechanisms 
ensure good data integrity and it determines who can see the data (Khan et al., 2012).  
Network visibility is one other key thing in IoT systems. Monitoring and diagnostics are 
vital to minimize and prevent the downtime (Evans & Annunziata, 2012). In monitoring, 
there are closely set algorithms to identify problems and changes according to history 
data and set limit rates. Thus, it is easily possible to connect two critical systems of IoT; 
monitoring and cyber security management. System is able to collect real time data and 
offer the architecture; parameters can be also monitor data structure, encryption, transfer 
mechanisms and the proper use of data (Evans & Annunziata, 2012). In addition to single 
event monitoring and alerts there should be trancing for emerging threats through the 
history data and sequences. E.g. if there is a single port scan event, it is not interesting, 
but if there is series of port scan it might be a sign for a system wide attack (Industrial 
Internet Consortium, 2015). 
3.2.2 Cloud layer security 
This layer like described is responsible for the service management and has a link to da-
tabase (Khan et al., 2012). It receives and collects information from the network and store 
it in the database. All these operations of course must comply with privacy regulations 
and still performance operations through data analysis (Industrial Internet Consortium, 
2015). Industrial Internet Reference Architecture (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015) 
describes four consideration shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Data distribution and storage security considerations (Industrial Internet Con-
sortium, 2015) 
Security consideration Description 
Data security This means encryption of the distributed data in all cir-
cumstances. Access control to the sensitive data should 
be enforced with authentication, authorization and con-
trol policy. 
Data centric policies This includes security requirements and policies like 
data security, privacy, integrity and ownership in all 
stages. This is set by industry standards and laws, e.g. 
44 
how to collect and file automotive information or vital 
parameters in a nuclear reactor. 
Data analysis and privacy Provide data access policy to enforce fine-grained data 
access rules. E.g. what information from the data records 
can be distributed with the 3rd parties. 
IT systems and the cloud Data storages are detached from the industrial system so 
provenance information and privacy requirements 
should be attached with the data. This helps to maintain 
the knowledge of ownership and custody chain. 
 
Like mentioned previously, the link between IT world and physical devices are done by 
interfaces. A secure basis for all traffic to and from the cloud platform is Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) encryption protocol or Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol. This is part 
of the end-to-end security and mitigates many kind of risks all over the IoT system. (Tel-
ekom, 2016) 
Main threats in cloud layer are flooding, malware, spoofing and message forging and 
intersection. Flooding means exhausting of the important resources by sending many con-
nection establishment requests. This can be easily mitigated by setting up connection es-
tablishment barriers for autonomic self-protection measures. Malware attacks confiden-
tiality of information. Malware may not affect sensors, but can exist for gateways being 
presented as applications in the mobile phones. So, infected mobile phone may show ap-
plication look-a-like authentication interface for the systems, but is really a malicious 
software. Mitigation for malware usually includes vulnerability scans and risk mitigation 
services. Spoofing means that attacker impersonates sensor node and it is noticed as a 
valid node. This way attacker can insert wrong kind of information for the system, mes-
sage forging also includes forwarding existing message with different content. These 
kinds of attacks can be mitigated with autonomic manner and encryption. In intersection 
attack, the goal is to defeat the privacy of the system by focusing on the auxiliary infor-
mation of the system. Attacker tries to get the privacy information model by collecting 
data from different sources (e.g. web, 3rd party records) and link them to create under-
standing of the systems. (Mamoon & Habaebi, 2015) This threat can be mitigates using 
e.g. k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002). 
Responsibility of the cloud layer attacks is a difficult to define. Cloud service providers 
are responsible for providing secure and standardized interactions, interfaces and storage. 
The steps between machine network and cloud can be attractive attack target. So, the 
implementations and cloud service provider selection should be done carefully. At this 
point a central surveillance authority might be required to define and monitor security 
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policies, authorizations and authentication mechanisms. Cloud service providers can 
prove their security by certificating it with information safety management systems, e.g. 
fulfilling ISO/IEC 27001 requirements. This way IoT systems owner can rely for the 
cloud provider. 
Responsible by the service provider is usually described in a service level agreement 
(SLA). Service level agreement defines customer needs, provides framework, reduce ar-
eas of conflict, eliminates unrealistic expectations and it is simple a list of promises how 
the cloud service is offered for the customer. Service level agreement discusses also how 
the security is maintained, what methods are used how customer communication is taken 
care (Kandukuri, 2009). From security point of view service level agreement should dis-
cuss at least following issues: 
Table 5. Security considerations in service level agreement (Kandukuri, 2009) 
Security issue Description 
Privileged user access Information about the people who manage and have an 
access to data. 
Regulatory compliance Service provider offer proof or willingness to perform 
external audits and security certifications. 
Data location Which country data is stored and how they obey local 
privacy regulations. 
Data segregation Evidence about encryption schemes are designed and 
tested by experience specialists. 
Recovery How backups are set up and where. And what is the post-
disaster strategy. 
Investigative support Support for the investigation requests in case of inappro-
priate or illegal activity. 
Long-term viability What is the process in case of bankruptcy or acquisition.  
3.2.3 Application layer security 
In application layer security issues can differ a lot between the applications and systems. 
This is because, there is no standard application which is used in this layer. Application 
layer security is complex. In this part application layer security is approached by Zhao et. 
al. sum of some common security problems (Zhao & Ge, 2013) in Table 6 and Open Web 
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Application Security Project approach of application threat modelling and awareness for 
web application security (OWASP, 2017).  
Table 6. Common security problems in application layer (Zhao & Ge, 2013) 
Application security prob-
lem 
Description 
Data access permissions 
and identity authentication 
Effective authentication technology should be imple-
mented, with spam/malicious information processing. 
Data protection and recov-
ery 
User privacy and data loss mechanisms.  
The ability of dealing with 
mass-data. 
If data processing can’t meet with the requirements and 
needs of data flow, it might lead to network interruption 
and data loss. 
Software vulnerabilities Software and code is not developed to meet security 
standards and expectations.  
 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a worldwide non-profit organ-
isation focused on improving software security. OWASP gives articles, methodologies, 
documentation, tools and technology for application security. OWASP methodologies are 
in common use among information security professionals, when web application security 
tasks are conducted. In this research, it is not necessary to explore very it very precisely, 
but top risks and preventing should be explored. Application security is important be-
cause, attackers can use many different paths through application to do harm. Every po-
tential bath is representing risk for getting hands into lower levels of technology and in-
formation in IoT architecture. In IoT systems there are usually many applications imple-
mented, so it is important to shut all possible paths for exploit, or at least make it difficult. 
OWASP top ten most critical web applications security risks and preventions are de-
scribed below top down: (OWASP, 2017; OWASP, 2013) 
1. Injection means sending untrusted data e.g. SQL command to the system and the 
system can that way execute unintended commands. This can be prevented by 
using safe API or whitelisting the inputs. 
2. Broken Authentication and Session Management means that attacker can com-
promise passwords, keys or session tokens or exposing other identities. This can 
be prevented by using a single set of strong authentication and session manage-
ment control 
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3. Cross-site Scripting (XSS) occurs when application takes untrusted data and 
send it to a web browser without proper validation. Preventing this threat requires 
separation control from untrusted data to active browser content e.g. with white-
listing inputs or using auto-sanitization libraries. 
4. Insecure Direct Object References occurs when developer exposes way to get 
internal implementation object like file or directory. This can be prevented by 
using indirect object references and access control checks. 
5. Security misconfiguration means that good security configurations are con-
ducted with application, framework, web server, database server and platform. 
And also, the configurations are updated regularly when needed.  
6. Sensitive Data Exposure poses information for attackers e.g. credit cards and 
personal information. This kind of exposure is mitigated using cryptography for 
all sensitive data with strong key management and avoiding storing unnecessary 
personal data.   
7. Missing Function Level Access Control is happened when the identification is 
for the application is going to happen. Different access levels for the service is 
given according the credentials, attackers are able to forge different level access 
controls if the control checks are not safely created. This kind of control check 
can be created by authorization module. 
8. Cross-site Request Forgery forces to send logged users cookies and authentica-
tion information. This allow attacker to force victim’s browser to generate re-
quests the vulnerability application thinks are legitimate requests from the victim. 
9. Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities. These components can be 
such as libraries, frameworks and software modules. Attack can cause data loss 
and server takeover. This can be prevented by updated software components, in 
some cases security can be increased by added security wrappers, monitoring 
components and established security policies.  
10. Invalidated Redirects and Forwards to other pages and websites which can be 
phishing or malware sites. This can be prevented by avoiding redirecting sites or 
involving destination parameters to ensure validity of supplier. (OWASP, 2013) 
In industrial internet systems, many of the applications are used through mobile user in-
terface. Mobile security is therefore one of the security issues also. Of course, when de-
veloping a mobile application, there are many similar threats that with a normal web based 
application. Mobile security should enable ubiquitous and easy access to IoT data while 
providing control and security. It is also good to consider that mobile device monitoring 
and control does not use the personal information of mobile user. Mobile security the 
simplest is already presented device identification, authentication, key and credential stor-
age and exchange. (Sicari et al., 2015) 
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4. RESEARCH METHODS 
This empirical part of the research is conducted from the theoretical framework created 
using literature and other researches of the researched are. There are articles and re-
searches about the IoT security, but answering to the main research questions is hard to 
find straight answers. IIRA (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015) research gives as a 
good insight what is important in securing IoT systems, but does not take a stand where 
in architecture companies should prioritize the security investments. In Chapter 5. Inter-
viewing results are assembled together and conclusion combines theory and empirical 
party by offering a model for how information security risks could be prioritized in in-
dustrial internet security development. Challenge collecting theoretical framework was 
that there was not so many extensive researches about Industrial Internet security. The 
area is still developing and the standardization of the IoT security is not completed.  
Like said, theoretical framework was created by using literature review from industrial 
internet, IoT security and other supporting material. The goal in empirical part is to ana-
lyse top business risks and information security risks in industrial internet information 
security. In order to do this, theoretical framework offers information about industrial 
internet, its maturity and architecture and what are the security threats and methods of 
prevention them. Firstly, industrial internet theory was presented and on that architecture, 
security aspects were added. Theory was conducted by using big number of different kind 
of articles. Difficulty creating comprehensive theory was that most of the articles took 
stand generally on Internet of Things. Industrial Internet is only part of the Internet of 
Things, so choices had to be made in order to just keep the theory around Industrial In-
ternet. E.g. privacy related things were not studied in such detail, because priori personal 
information is not collected from industrial internet systems. In theoretical framework, 
many security related details were simplified. This research should give an overall review 
about how to secure industrial internet system, now how to do it precisely. This research 
should be able to read by people which have basic knowledge from the researched are, 
not by people who wants details. E.g. there are many different kind of wireless commu-
nications technologies like 3G, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth etc. but it introducing how to secure 
them precisely is not intended. It is just good to know that there are different kind of 
technologies and how the wireless communications are generally secured. Some of the 
literature researches and articles goes really deep into some specific details about certain 
subjects, e.g. how to secure communications. This complicated the decisions what is rel-
evant to go through in theory and what is not. Also, some of the articles are conducted by 
using old reference material, what means that some of the details might be old-dated in 
this fast changing are of application. 
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Empirical part of the research was realized by arranging unstructured interviews using 
Appendix 1 as an interview frame. Interview frame was prepared by choosing the themes 
we want to know in order to answer the research questions. When preparing questions, it 
was important that they are created in such a manner that it is easy to answer and create 
conversation. It was important to ask questions which are more general about industrial 
internet and its security. Detailed questions about industrial internet security would have 
been hard to answer, because interviews were conducted to management. Delimiting this 
research for industrial vendor segment was good, because the overall view about indus-
trial internet was the same. But the maturity of the industrial internet represent companies 
were different and this is what should be taken into account in the results. Also, the scope 
of industrial internet is big in the companies. Choosing and getting the right people inter-
viewed, which are able to understand the whole picture of industrial internet was difficult. 
Interviewed people were found through relations and just by searching suitable profiled 
people from LinkedIN and contacting them directly. 
The goal was to interview representatives from eight big industrial vendor companies in 
Finland. After all, representatives from six different companies were interviewed. In three 
interviews, there were one person participating, two interviews with two representatives 
and one with three representatives. All the companies and representatives are going to 
stay anonymous, because sensitive nature of the subject. Even titles are not exposed in 
order to keep the privacy. Interview answers were collected by recording the interviews. 
One interview answers were collected by typing, by interviewees wish. Each company 
were given a short summary how they answered relative to other companies. In the Table 
7 interviewed persons and dates are described. 
Table 7. Persons interviewed for empirical research 
Organisation (code 
used from now on) 
Responsibilities and number of inter-
viewed persons 
Interview date 
A1 1 interviewee responsible of industrial inter-
net development 
20.10.2016 
A2 2 interviewees, responsibilities: 
- Responsible of automation development 
and maintenance 
- Responsible of industrial internet research 
and technologies 
4.11.2016 
A3 1 interviewee head of business line with the 
use of industrial internet technologies 
11.11.2016 
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A4 2 interviewees, responsibilities: 
- Head of business unit with the use of indus-
trial internet technologies 
- Responsible of data collection and infor-
mation management. 
18.11.2016 
A5 1 interviewee responsible of industrial inter-
net related cybersecurity 
22.11.2016 
A6 3 interviewees, responsibilities: 
- Digital Architecture 
- Information security 
- OT/IT integrations 
5.12.2016 
 
Timeframe for this research was from August 2016 to April 2017. The actual theoretical 
framework research including getting familiar with the source material in writing the the-
ory took time from September 2016 to February 2017.  
 
Figure 18. Phases of the research in relation to time 
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5. RESULTS – UNSTUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
In this part, interview results are conducted from the interviews and structured by the 
questions. Questions for semi-structured interviews can be found from Appendix 1. 
5.1 Industrial Internet maturity 
First interviewers were asked how industrial internet appears in the company and what is 
the maturity of it. When asking this question, architecture of industrial internet and M2M 
Maturity model was shown (Figures 5 and 9). Every interviewed company’s revenue is 
calculated in billions, so in Finnish scale they are really big. Every company informs 
industrial internet to be an important venture and for most of the companies’ digitalization 
is one of the strategic focus points. It is important to understand the maturity and the use 
of the industrial internet, because with that information this research can offer also a point 
of view that which cyber risks have been risen on different stages of maturity. 
There is not so many differences with maturity model positioning between interviewed 
companies. In big companies in Finland, devices have been smart for years, even for dec-
ades. Third industrial revolution has enabled the use of IT and embedded devices. But 
there were no open interfaces to public internet and all the data was only used sited itself. 
Today computing power has increased and sensors has become cheaper, allows more so-
phisticated use of IT and harnessing the benefits of industrial internet. 
In these interviewed companies, there are many different kind of product and business 
lines. It is clear that the company, as a whole, is not at the same phase of industrial internet 
maturity at the same time. Also, depending on customer segment how the industrial in-
ternet can be implemented. Interviewers mentioned, that some customers do not easily 
offer interfaces to public internet in order to transfer data. E.g. in maintenance critical 
environments like in energy business it is difficult to access the data because of the pos-
sible risks of doing so.  
In M2M Maturity Model (Figure 5) maturity is divided into four steps; smart connection, 
smart analytics, deep learning and new business. Smart devices have been in use for years 
and smart analytics has collectively been implemented last years. Overall every company 
answered that the maturity with their industrial internet is somewhere between smart an-
alytics and deep learning. Maturity of interviewed companies is presented in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Maturity in interviewed companies 
All interviewed companies positioned themselves as average or forerunners of the indus-
trial internet maturity in this segment. However, every company said that their maturity 
is somewhere between smart analytics and deep learning. Some of the products might 
already be in the stage of deep learning but most of the business is in the level of smart 
analytics. Respondent A6 seemed to be just a little bit below from the others, saying that 
they are mostly using smart analytics but not yet everywhere. 
Companies have used internal servers for a while, where all the data is collected. This is 
mainly because this kind of technology has been possible to implement for years. Public 
clouds for this kind of industry is rather new thing. And before comprehensive big data 
analytics, public clouds have not brought any benefits for the business. The big change 
among the interviewed companies is that they are at the moment in a big change from 
private clouds and servers to public, 3rd party offered cloud services. This is something 
where are still many question marks and how to implement it efficiently. And private 
clouds are and are going to be important in critical environments.  
New business is also interesting point of view for the industrial vendor companies. The 
basic outcome is that customers can see their products and their condition through appli-
cations. But in some cases, it is not so simple that giving a customer interface to monitor 
conditions of devices. Some factories can run though day and night, despite the condition 
of the products they are able to change products only during a planned maintenance out-
age, which is performed e.g. every five years. In this kind of business, the real values e.g. 
of predictive maintenance can remain limited. New business can be also tricky, because 
every industrial site and customer is unique itself, many of the industrial vendor compa-
nies of course offer tailored solutions for the customers. This can also be a show stopper 
for many industrial internet possibilities. In these kind of cases, possible new business 
kind of systems can be really expensive and it is hard to get value out of them. Common 
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difficulty to harness new business opportunities in industrial internet applications were 
that the customers are not able to implement new kind of technologies and in some cases, 
they are not even willing to start talking about giving their information out from the com-
pany’s firewalls. Also, one thing to consider new business was that if industrial devices 
are becoming fully automated without human intervention, it can risk the physical safety 
in factory site. 
Industrial internet is a kind of a hype like artificial intelligence and big data at the moment. 
Many companies do have industrial internet in their strategy, but only small group in the 
companies understand the possibilities of the industrial internet. So, there is a lot of work 
to do in the cultural change also.  
5.2 Information security risk analysis in industrial internet 
5.2.1 Why to invest in information security? 
Interviewees were first asked why to invest in information security. After that they were 
asked if there are so big information security risks which prevents the full use of industrial 
internet potential. After overall questions, business risk was examined more specifically 
and they were pointed into the industrial internet architecture. 
Question three in the interview dealt with the overall feeling why companies should invest 
in information security in industrial internet. Reason for asking this question was that we 
can get an impulsive answer what are the first things what comes in the mind as the big-
gest considers of the industrial internet security. Answers were pretty similar among the 
interviewees. After the overall question, more detailed question about business risks was 
asked in question five. 
The overall answer for the question, why to invest in information security in industrial 
internet system was that always when interfaces from site to public internet is opened, 
attack surface will grow radically. In this point for securing the production and customer 
information, it is vital to have this interface secured. This can be compared with physical 
safety, why there are locks and guards at the office premises? So, when endpoint com-
munication functionality is created between devices and data storage, networks should be 
segmented, identity and access management, encryption and other protections should 
work. According the A2 information security should be done correctly right away, it 
should be implemented already in the planning and architecture. If the information secu-
rity is not implemented in planning phase, it is really hard to add there afterwards. A1 
answered that information security investments should be tolerable. Industrial devices 
should have basic security implemented, but while the competition is hard in this segment, 
all the investments which may increase the price of the product or decrease its margin, 
must be considered carefully. But when talking about individual device, the value of the 
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transferred data should be taken into consideration all the time, because what would at-
tacker do with the data of individual device? But if the attacker is able to get into the 
bigger system and more comprehensive through the device, it should be taken into ac-
count. 
One main answer for this question was that with the information security investments and 
security of the products, companies are able to convince customers and that will gain 
trust. There is not yet many cyber-attacks in this segment, not that many that it would be 
a big problem. That is maybe one reason that information security has not been the main 
issue of the industrial internet development and making the legacy products open to pub-
lic internet. But there is always a flip side; if the amount of attacks will increase signifi-
cantly, industrial companies are going to close the interfaces and data communications to 
outside world, which will be a close call for industrial internet. 
It was said that there might be customer demands for information security in order to stay 
in the race. But also, customers could demand information security to be reflected in some 
certain standards like ISO27001 or some energy sector standards. At the moment, there 
are not yet standardized solutions for industrial internet security, but customer can value 
that product information security is compared with some general standards.  
5.2.2 Is information security hampering industrial internet de-
velopment? 
Question four in the interview was that “Is there so significant information security risks 
that industrial internet cannot be implement as its full potential?”. This means that in some 
phase of industrial internet maturity and development, are the information security risks 
growing so big that the development cannot be implemented. Answers can be seen below: 
Table 8. Answers of the questions related to information security show stoppers 
Respondent Answer 
A1 There are not so big risks. 
A2 There are no show stopper risks; all the risks should be all recognized 
and then mitigated. This should be done with every risk. 
A3 Yes. Some industrial companies do not want to open interface outside, 
because they are not familiar with all the risks or do not want to take 
risks. This affects implementing industrial internet technologies. 
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A4 No, we are living in society where everything is shared and connected. 
Information security is always considered and there are technologies to 
mitigate risks. 
A5 Business values goes first, information security follows business deci-
sions. 
A6 Not that kind of risks, but the problem is that customers are not willing 
to open interfaces outside factory sites. But it is not impossible that in 
the future there might be that kind of cyber-attacks which will affect on 
this questions also. 
 
According the answers can be assumed that there is not at the moment so big security 
risks (five out of six respondents answered “no”) that will be affect how well industrial 
internet can be implemented. However, respondents cannot forecast what the future will 
bring and if there will be really high risks in cyber security which just cannot be mitigated 
with known protocols.  
5.2.3 Top business risk attached to information security con-
cerns 
In the next phase respondents were asked about the main business risks, this means that 
what is the main business risk or lost they are afraid of cyber security attack is going to 
happen. They were shown a list of main business risks what would occur from bad infor-
mation security. They could use it in order to help to answer to this question or they were 
also free to choose an answer outside of this list. Respondents gave their opinion top three 
business risks, biggest risk coming as a number one: 
Table 9. Top3 business risks in relation to cyber attack 
Respondent Answer 
A1 1. Availability 
2. Customer data 
3. Integrity 
A2 1. Availability / interruption of the production 
2. Customer compliance 
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3. Reputation 
A3 1. Availability / interruption of the production 
2. Information risk (customer or own data) 
3. no answer 
A4 1. Availability / interruption of the production 
2. Information risk (customer or own data) 
3. Reputation 
A5 1. Availability / interruption of the production 
2. Customer compliance 
3. Information risk 
A6 1. Information risk 
2. Reputation 
3. Availability / interruption of the production 
 
Next question (Question 7, Appendix 1) asked respondents to localize business risk to 
industrial internet architecture. Every business risk was not gone through precisely, but 
overall feeling where from the architecture would those mentioned business risks occur. 
Four out of six (A1-A4) respondents answered with one accord that the biggest risk in at 
the perception layer; including smart devices and connections to the edge of the cloud. 
A5 answered that it is not so unambiguous to localize risks to certain point of architecture. 
It is important to constantly parse attack vector and then mitigate risks and build protec-
tion. A6 answered that there are two critical ways in order to risky business; get customer 
information from cloud with some kind of bug or vulnerability, or device will be updated 
or controlled remotely from cloud or application which will interrupt the production. 
When roughly highlighted these attack vectors to industrial internet architecture, it will 
look like this: 
57 
 
Figure 20. Business risk focused on IoT architecture 
Even if respondents said that the biggest risks might happen in perception layer, they 
highlighted still that the biggest single risk for industrial internet security is the user. This 
means that reason for cyber-attack can be very humane; using infected USB sticks, leak-
ing passwords and phishing attempts.  
5.3 Information security risks in industrial internet 
Question 8 in interview handled concrete information security risks. Like in business risk 
related questions, respondents were asked to describe top three information security risks. 
After arranging the information security risks, respondents were asked to target the risks 
to the industrial internet architecture. 
Table 10. Answers for information security risk question 
Respondent Answer 
A1 1. Network vulnerabilities 
2. Physical threat 
3. Embedded security 
A2 1. Identity management 
2. Encrypted communications 
3. Physical threat 
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A3 1. Cloud interface vulnerabilities 
2. Network vulnerabilities 
3. Embedded security 
A4 1. Encrypted communications 
2. Cloud interface vulnerabilities 
3. Identity management 
A5 1. Identity management 
2. Privacy 
3. Mobile security 
A6 1. Identity management 
2. Embedded security 
3. Physical threat 
 
All these information security risks also were positioned to the industrial internet archi-
tecture. Information security risks with emphasis can be seen in the following figure: 
 
Figure 21. Answered information security risks pointed out in industrial internet archi-
tecture 
When looking at the Figure 21, it can be seen that respondents are highly concerned about 
perception layer information security risks. Specially communications network between 
sensor and cloud is something where most of the information security risks can be posi-
tioned. This will affect to the model which we will introduce in Section 6. 
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6. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Discussion 
The main findings from the empirical study was that companies are scared interruptions 
in production and information risk. This basically means that most risk for the companies 
is in the customer interface. Companies are not afraid losing their own data, but losing 
customer data from their industrial internet system and applications. Identity manage-
ment, embedded security and physical threat were the biggest information security risks 
for interviewed companies. All business risks and information security risks were posi-
tioned to perception and network layer of the industrial internet security. This tells that 
there are wider attack areas, legacy systems and devices and companies may not have full 
control for the operations in those layers yet. 
In the research interviewed companies were first asked why to invest in information se-
curity. After that they were asked if there are so big information security risks which 
prevents the full use of industrial internet potential. After overall questions, business risk 
was examined more specifically and they were pointed into the industrial internet archi-
tecture. 
Also, it was good to notice that companies are not exactly innovating the industrial inter-
net security approaches. They know that for every problem there are already solutions 
available. If companies need to e.g. add some extra encryption on their industrial internet 
communications, they can do the research and implement already known technologies. 
Information security is implemented step by step using already known technologies. This 
approach has worked.  
In empirical part interviewees were asked more generally that as an industrial vendor, in 
what are information security investments are especially important. Response was gener-
ally that of course companies must pay attention for the weakest points of the system. 
This kind of work happens all the time in companies and information security work is 
continuing. All thought when thinking about original information security, it usually 
means governance risk and IT security. Industrial Internet brings its special perspective 
with smart devices and stakeholder participation. This is why usually the information 
security work is focused for the perception layer. 
In the interviews, there were also small discussions about the liabilities in industrial in-
ternet technologies. This is good questions, because there are lot of service providers in-
cluding building the industrial internet system. According respondents, responsibilities 
are usually done dynamically with subcontractors and service providers. With the service 
providers, a comprehensive valuation must be created in order to answer the questions; 
60 
are they a secure partner and is their operational model suitable for the company in legal 
point of view. Responsibilities are created always case-by-case, but someone has to take 
the total responsibility and usually it is the industrial vendor; but of course, cloud provider 
is responsible of their SLA and application partner is responsible that secure code is de-
livered. 
The last question of the questionnaire was about asking risk management methods for the 
top three information security risks. This question was generally hard to understand and 
answers were very variated. As a conclusion, there are lot of different kind of models, 
guidelines and certifications were to compare own information security work, but there 
is no standardized way for industrial internet yet. Some customer may ask about the cer-
tifications, but e.g. ISO 27001 certification is a huge work for the company and it can 
create really heavy processes for the company. But still, these kinds of guidelines must 
be taken into account in order to meet the customer compliance demands. It is important 
that industrial vendor company understand their status of information security work and 
works according the prevailing situation. For this work also affect the detail that is there 
common goal for information security work or is it just an active process in action.  
6.2 Conclusions 
Industrial internet, as a part of Internet of Things, is going to be a big change in industrial 
and manufacturing world. Drivers towards the change are considerable, when it is tech-
nologically possible and big companies are setting the digitalization in their strategies. 
But there is the “but” behind the hype; cyber security. It is easy to become a cybercriminal 
and earn reasonably well. There are plenty of examples how factories and sites has been 
attacked with very sophisticated ways. Industrial companies compete in global markets 
where product cost is tuned to its peak. The fear of the cyber-attacks is present, but at the 
same time companies might lack the skills and resources how to mitigate cyber threats. 
This thesis collected information about industrial internet and its maturity, after that a 
theoretical framework of industrial internet cyber security was combined from today’s 
articles and researches. In empirical part, big Finnish industrial vendor companies and 
their business leaders were interviewed about their visions and feelings about the cyber 
security of industrial internet. As a result, top business risks and information security risks 
was conducted and they were positioned to the industrial internet architecture. All the 
appropriate information was combined and rough model how to approach cyber security 
in Finnish industrial vendor companies was introduced. 
Original motivation to do this research was that there is no standardized model how to 
approach information security in industrial internet system.  There are huge threats when 
smart devices are connected to the internet (Saarelainen & Collin, 2016), but at the same 
time there are lack of information security knowledge in business lead and that’s why 
resources are not allocated for that work. One of the biggest industrial internet advocate 
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in Finland, former-CEO of Konecranes Pekka Lundmark, has said (Lehto, 2015) that in-
dustrial internet will success or fall for cyber security. There is a contradict for this all 
hype and this research was done to understand what it most important in cyber security 
in industrial internet companies. 
Research question 1, RQ1, “What are industrial internet information security risks and 
how they should be mitigated in Finnish industrial vendor segment?” is answered pretty 
widely in the research. Theoretical framework gives a basis for this question by analysing 
overall risks for industrial internet information security. In this chapter, 6.3. Recommen-
dations, more generalized model for this question is conducted. “Research questions RQ1, 
RQ2 and RQ3 were well answered. For the research questions RQ2, “What kind of infor-
mation security risks appears in different levels of industrial internet architecture?”, and 
RQ3 “Why is it important to invest in industrial internet cyber in industrial vendor seg-
ment?”, results were basically mostly answered in theoretical framework. For the RQ3 
there was also results in the empirical state. Research question RQ4, “What is the role of 
industrial vendor company in industrial internet information security?”, was not an-
swered so clearly. Some theoretical framework and empirical results referred for this 
question. But also like said in empirical results, all the responsibilities with 3rd party pro-
viders are always negotiated case by case and agreements and SLAs are created.” Sub-
questions (SQ1 and SQ2) are more supportive questions to parse theoretical framework, 
these questions are answered in theoretical framework. 
6.3 Recommendations 
In section 5 empirical study to Finnish industrial vendor sector companies was executed, 
and results about information security in industrial internet was found. Research Question 
1 (RQ1) asked that:  How industrial internet security should be approached in Finnish 
industrial vendor segment? This section will compile results for that main research ques-
tion. In theoretical framework, there was lot of information security threats and mitiga-
tions introduced, but it did not take stand what is relevant and in what order for securing 
the industrial internet.  
In this research, the companies under investigation have already start their Industrial In-
ternet journey. Mostly have smart devices with some kind of connections, some have 
already created very sophisticated methods to collect and use the data in their system. 
When creating a guideline how to invest into industrial internet security, it should be also 
taken into account that there are still machines that are not connected into the industrial 
internet system. Like seen in Figure 19 interviewed companies’ maturity level is smart 
analytics and in some cases or business units’ deep analytics. We can assume that there 
are some kind of communications already created. 
Respondents described in interviews that if information security becomes hard and com-
plicated it will not get implemented. Manufacturing today is very agile and it always finds 
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a cost-effective way to do things. If information security is complex and expensive, it will 
not be implemented. Even if information security level is a competitive advantage, indus-
trial vendors compete very price driven market, so the components should not increase 
the price of the products. 
In order to give recommendations for information security work in industrial internet, 
business risks and information security should be conducted from the Section 5. When 
business risk answers according Table 9 is conducted, and pointing results as follows; top 
one risk got 1.5point, number two 1.25 point and number three 1.00 points. When adding 
these together we can have a table for top business risks: 
 
Figure 22. Business risks valued from the answer 
Top three business risk were pretty obvious, but when looking deeper those answer, it can 
be seen that reputation is more like an outcome if cyber-attack happens at it will go public. 
But as a business risk point of view interruption of production and information risk were 
the highest. Interruption of production was a risk if it happens in customer premises, it 
could cause billion scale losses. Also, the information risk was not considered so bad if 
own device data is stolen, but if through device attacker is able to stole customer data and 
get hand into their systems. Customer compliance in this case means that company is able 
to offer products which will meet customer requirements. E.g. in energy sector they can 
be pretty demanding in specific markets. 
It is difficult to analyze severity and probability, because industrial vendor companies are 
not able to impact them in customer sites. Just hope, that own device is not behind the 
possible cyber-attacks. But of course, companies are able to give best practices for secu-
rity and offer services with devices which will possibly improve.  
Scoring the information security risks from the Table 10 in the same way with business 
risks will give following results: 
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Figure 23. Information security risks in order according interview answers 
Identity management emerged in many answers and got the highest points. Identity man-
agement can be understood both device identifications and user identity management. 
Together four respondents answered identity management to be one of the top three in-
formation security risks. When described in more detail, two of those answers referred to 
device identities and two to user identification. But overall, identity management is not 
an unambiguous to understand and we can generalize that identity management is im-
portant in many ways in industrial internet systems. Also, when mobile interfaces and 
communications are becoming more common, device identification is in a key role. Al-
ways when e.g. new device appears to the system, it is critical to identify it as a right 
device. These kind of attack surfaces are all over the industrial internet network. In some 
customer facilities, there are still old devices in use and thus there is not even possibility 
to use mobile networks and identifications. Identity management is also important be-
cause information is shared with other stakeholders. When there are a lot of external iden-
tities in the system, it also set big requirements and protocols from identity and access 
management. 
When checking the interview results from business risk and information security threat 
point of view, can be concluded that interviewed companies generally are working with 
the same problems and in the same level in industrial internet architecture. Some compa-
nies could have been taken some things into account than other, but security development 
process of course operates from acknowledged risk point of view. In order to clarify 
where should the industrial internet security work start potential threats and business im-
pacts should be identified.  Carty et. al. (2012) introduced a security investment model 
where different defence layers in linear fashion prevents malicious attacks.  
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Figure 24. Layer of defence in information security attacks (Carty et al., 2012) 
These defence layers have been chosen in that order, because it facilitates the calculation 
of risk and estimation of value of security investments (Carty et al., 2012). At the first 
step, there is governance and personnel and management of this layer is a quick win in 
order to mitigate cyber risks. Three of six respondents in interviews pointed that a blue-
collar worker around smart devices or application user is the easiest target for cyber-
attack. Educating the users and stakeholders can prevent human errors.  
 
Figure 25. A systematic approach for IoT security (Riahi et al., 2013) and CIA-model 
 
Riahi et. al. (2013) introduces a systematic approach for IoT security. This model consists 
of four different dimensions; person, technological ecosystem, intelligent object and pro-
cess (Riahi et al., 2013). These four dimensions should be covered when implementing a 
IoT security process. For the person defined rules, processes and limitations. Process in 
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this means accomplishing tasks in IoT environment according the security requirements. 
Intelligent object means an object what is capable of communicating with the environ-
ment and respond to events. Technological ecosystem refers to technological choices 
made to ensure the security. Choices can affect in affect in every layer of Industrial Inter-
net architecture. This is something to consider all the time when improving and analyzing 
Industrial Internet security. CIA-model is something that is generally used as a principal 
for information security work for organizations, this has already been introduced in sec-
tion 3.1. In Industrial Internet systems availability rises over confidentiality and integrity, 
at this can be seen already in the top three business risk in empirical part. 
Every development work starts from current status mapping. In industrial internet secu-
rity, this means identification of potential threats with their possible business impacts. 
After this it is possible to get an understanding and visibility of potential threats. In section 
five, respondents already gave a harsh estimate what do they think that are the biggest 
security threats and positioned them at the Industrial Internet architecture. In section three 
there was IIRA’s list of relevant security concerns (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015). 
The list of these relevant security concerns also highlighted endpoint security and com-
munication between the endpoints very vital. These are elements that also aims for data 
confidentiality and trust (Babar et al., 2010). The security development work should be 
based on the main business risks, in this case this refers for availability and information 
risk in perception layer and cloud. 
Theoretical framework and empirical results are being combined using the model of layer 
of defense from Figure 24. From all this information, a model how industrial internet 
information security can be approached is introduced. The model is presented below, in 
Figure 26. 
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Figure 26. Proposed model for industrial internet security 
First some kind of roadmap should be created and have an understanding that continuous 
information security improvement work and management should be done. At the first 
phase, when industrial internet capabilities are implemented, in information security point 
of view, there is quick wins with information security training. Industrial internet security 
plan can be created only when current state is known. Everything what is done for infor-
mation security should first being planned and compared. This gives understanding how 
to improve information security. As a conclusion to this phase, it is said that information 
security should be a continuous process inside the organization. 
After the evaluation, technical improvements are conducted. Many of the responded com-
panies have already smart devices in use and many of the improvements of Figure 26 is 
already noticed and taken into account. Also, it is very difficult to change some features 
like physical appearance and chosen technologies afterwards. In principle, it is very dif-
ficult to overlay information security improvements. But also, there are ways like hard-
ening and network security to taken into account in this section. Network architecture and 
segmentation is something to improve in this phase. In site premises, it is also important 
that there is an understanding that the attacker is not able to violate customer security 
though device or its’ network. Device should be implemented with ways of recovery from 
the disaster. In order to maintain customer production, site end network should be able to 
work “offline”. This means that if there is a cyber-attack, machine or network should 
notice it and is then able to continue its’ process ignoring the attack. Industrial compo-
nents should be able to work without connections to outside. In this phase, some certifi-
cations e.g. Https and TSL can be implemented. 
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After technical improvements, platform and governance improvements should be imple-
mented. After technical improvements, identity and access management should be imple-
mented in the industrial internet system. This means whitelisting with networks and de-
vices, endpoint identity, access control, logging capabilities and creating a remote police 
management. Most of the interviewed companies are in this phase according the inter-
view. In this phase, whole network security should be improved from endpoint to end-
point, above all from device to cloud interface. Platform improvements also enables re-
mote access and configurations to the endpoints. 
In the next phase cloud and application improvements are done. Of course, technology 
vendor evaluations are done before, but in this phase, it is important to understand how 
the data is stored in cloud services and used in applications. Concept how to evaluate 
security should be implemented when co-operating with 3rd party service providers. Com-
panies should evaluate is it possible at all to co-operate with certain service providers; 
technological, legal, insurance, SLAs and responsible rule aspects should always be eval-
uated. Cloud and application security improvements and manners are already discussed 
in greater detail in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Interviewed companies did not yet took these 
aspects as a priority. These security improvements are coming after the industrial internet 
system is secured in lower layers of industrial internet architecture. 
Monitoring is introduced as a last phase of industrial internet security model. Security 
monitoring gives a real-time snapshot from the industrial internet system. This increases 
the situation awareness. In concrete, security operations center observes anomalies from 
industrial internet system. Diagnostics is collected with SIEM (Security information and 
event management) service. Monitoring collects information from the endpoints, security 
events, attack attempts, status, health and so on (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015). 
Monitoring parameters are basically implemented by the need of the industrial internet 
system in order to maintain security and predict or notify attacks and changes. 
Overall, there are two things to consider when companies are securing the industrial in-
ternet system; return of investments in information security improvements and efficiency 
of the used security strategy and actions. Technical improvements what the competitor is 
implements may not work with other company. Also, with global and hard competition it 
is always hard to define what security investments are important and are not affecting for 
the price of the product. Information security work should be planned well, overlays usu-
ally don’t work well enough. 
6.4 Critical evaluation 
Theoretical framework was conducted first in order to understand industrial internet and 
industrial internet cyber security. Information for industrial internet was easy to find and 
contribute, Saarelainen & Collin’s (2016) book Teollinen Internet (Industrial Internet) 
was published just before this thesis started. The book gave a good and easy to read 
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framework also for the theoretical part of this research. Combining other articles and re-
searches gave good view for industrial internet, its architecture and maturity. Information 
security framework for industrial internet was harder to conduct. There is not so many 
comprehensive industrial internet security researches. There are many shorter articles 
about IoT information security. Many of these articles are written in certain perspectives 
and decision was made if there is something for industrial internet security, e.g. privacy 
related security concerns were counted out almost fully because in industrial internet sys-
tem, personal data is saved in principle only as a user information. Many of the IoT in-
formation security related articles offered only highlighted concerns or random lists about 
the security threats and mitigation. Difficulty was to find relevant information an priori-
tize it in order to answer industrial internet related information security concerns. IIRA 
framework (Industrial Internet Consortium, 2015) was also established in the year 2016 
and for the first time that article gave a good reference architecture how to take security 
concerns into account in industrial internet architecture. This research helped to keep 
logic with security framework. Information security was also approached very general 
level, so many detailed things were left out.  Research questions “What is industrial in-
ternet by architecture and maturity?” (SQ1) and “What kind of cyber risks are associated 
with industrial internet?” (SQ2) were answered well in theoretical framework. Challenge 
is also that within the framework of master thesis was that there was not time to analyse 
deeply all the potential research material. So, it can be a possibility that some relevant 
articles could have been missed. 
Empirical study was done in order to know what is the status and believes about industrial 
internet and its information security in Finnish industrial vendor companies. Interviews 
was sensible to arrange with companies in order to answer main research questions. Of 
course, when big companies are interviewed, it is difficult to choose the right persons for 
the interview. In this research information technology, industrial automation, cyber secu-
rity, industrial internet and general business leaders were interviewed, they have common 
that they are in the middle of the industrial internet change and responsible some way of 
its success. It was good to have different kind of representatives from different companies 
in order to create general model for industrial vendor segment. There might have had few 
more interviews, but with this scope strong similarities were found. In the semi-structured 
interviews, different kind of lists was formed to help respondents answer the questions. 
This was done, because it was known that not every respondent had a background from 
information security. Also, there is a risk that lists drives discussion in a certain direction, 
but created lists were extensive and it was said that answers can be also outside of the 
listed items.  Half-structured interviews also were conducted for many few interviewees. 
Many of the respondents did not have concrete experience about finished industrial inter-
net system and what it could bring as a finish product. This affects also that they do not 
have historical data about how the security should be done in the implementation phase. 
But also, a point of this research was to get information what are companies believes how 
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cyber security should be taken into account when industrial internet technologies are im-
plemented. 
Some critical evaluation about the creation of theoretical framework and empirical part 
was already done above. It is good to evaluate that can the research results be generalized. 
This research was done mainly for the industrial vendor segment. But overall, when im-
plementing industrial internet system, there are similar bottlenecks and risks regardless 
of the user segment. Of course, emphasis of the risk can be different. But overall results 
can be in very high level generalized for the use of industrial internet information security.  
Biggest single grievance for the qualification for the results are that every industrial com-
pany is different. It means that whatever the model is, every company is creating their 
own kind of industrial internet system, using different technologies and outcome goals 
even might be different. That’s why it is good to have different kind of lists about things 
to consider with the project, but the certain truth in company realization might be some-
thing different. It is good notice also that all the companies are at the same phase of in-
dustrial internet maturity (Figure 19). This research is not giving answers about, what if 
maturity is lower or higher. Information security risks might be different in different lev-
els of industrial internet maturity. In this phase, smart connections have been created, so 
the main concern from information security perspective from the result point of view on 
smart devices and connections. But at the higher level of industrial internet maturity cloud 
and application level technology is implemented, different kind of information security 
risks rises also. So when evaluating these results, it has to be noticed that the mitigation 
methods are not exploitable in all companies that are implementing industrial internet 
technology. 
6.5 Suggestions for further research 
In order to make as versatile approach for industrial internet cyber security as possible, 
more research should be done. Here is some list about possible further research topics 
whose were poorly handled in this thesis: 
• Industrial internet information security shared responsibilities: This research 
poorly answered and researched the topic about how responsibilities of the indus-
trial internet security are or can be divided. This topic was really lightly gone 
through without a more detailed summary. 
 
• Information security recommendations at different levels of industrial inter-
net maturity level: In this research, all companies were at the same phase of in-
dustrial internet maturity. But how does the information security differ, when 
company is in the different phase of industrial internet maturity? 
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• Detailed investment quantities for industrial internet information security 
work: This topic was not gone through in this research. In addition to respondent 
feelings and opinions what is relevant of industrial internet security, they could 
have given emphasis about invested resources for top risks.  
 
• Best investment strategy for industrial internet security: It is known that it is 
impossible to mitigate all the cyber risks of the industrial internet. But what is the 
most efficient way to invest in cyber security in comparison of mitigated risks.   
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APPENDIX A: SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 
1. Kuka olet ja millainen tausta sinulla on? Mitä vastuualueita sinulla on? 
 
2. Miten teollinen internet ilmenee yrityksessä ja miten näet teollisen internetin 
kypsyyden tason?  
• Jatkokysymykset: Koska usein arkkitehtuurin eri vaiheissa ollaan eri ta-
soilla niin miten yrityksen osaaminen ja prosessit ovat kehittyneet eri 
vaiheissa? Esimerkiksi missä kypsyystasolla ollaan edellä ja missä jä-
ljessä?  
 
 
      Teollisen internetin arkkitehtuuri ja tietoturvallisuustasot. 
 
 
Teollisen internetin maturiteetti. 
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3. Miksi teollisen internetin tietoturvaan tulisi investoida? 
• Jatkokysymys: Nähdäänkö sellaisia merkittäviä riskejä, jotka ovat ni-
menomaan merkittäviä teollisen internetin käyttöönotossa verrattuna ny-
kyisiin tai muihin toimintatapoihin? 
 
4. Onko niin isoja tai suuria riskejä, ettei uskalleta ottaa teollista intranetiä käyt-
töön niin laajasti kuin olisi järkevää?  
 
5. Onko teollisen internetin tietoturvaan lähestytty jonkin tietyn mallin mukaan? 
Minkälaisen? 
 
 
6. Mitkä liiketoimintariskit nousevat vaikuttavimpina esiin teollisen internetin nä-
kökulmasta? (Taulukko1)  
• Jatkokysymys: Miksi nämä tietoturvariskit koetaan merkittävinä? 
• Nähdäänkö tietoturvariskit vakavina, eli mikä ajatus niiden merkittävyy-
destä ja todennäköisyydestä? 
 
7. Mitkä edellä mainituista riskeistä tai muista osuvat eri osa-alueisiin teollisen in-
ternetin arkkitehtuurissa (sijoitetaan riskit esimerkiksi komponentti-, verkko- tai 
sovellustasolle, tai näiden väliin)? (Taulukko1) 
 
8. Mitkä tietoturvariskit nousevat vaikuttavimpina esiin teollisen internetin näkö-
kulmasta? (top3) (Taulukko 2) 
• Jatkokysymys: Miksi nämä tietoturvariskit koetaan merkittävinä? 
 
9. Mitkä edellä mainituista riskeistä tai muista osuvat eri osa-alueisiin teollisen in-
ternetin arkkitehtuurissa (sijoitetaan riskit esimerkiksi komponentti-, verkko- tai 
sovellustasolle, tai näiden väliin)? (Taulukko2) 
 
10. Missä teollisen internetin arkkitehtuurin osa-alueella yrityksenne (Industrial ven-
dor –toimija) tietoturvaan panostaminen on erityisen tärkeää? 
• Jatkokysymys; onko tietyillä alueilla Industrial Vendor näkökulmasta tie-
toturvaan panostaminen tärkeää ja jossakin vaiheessa enemmän esimer-
kiksi enemmän teknologiapartnereiden (esim. Pilvipalvelutoimittaja) 
vastuulla? 
 
11. Mitkä ovat merkittävimpien (top3) riskien hallintakeinot? Ensimmäisen tason; 
komponenttitaso; siirtotaso;. Miksi nähdään tämän tyyppiset hallintakeinot tär-
keinä? 
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Taulukko1. Liiketoimintariskit 
Tietoturvariskien seurauksen liiketoiminnan näkökulmasta 
Business  
• Reputation 
• Compliance risk (Losing opportunities/customers because of the cannot 
fulfil standards) 
• Information risk: 
1. Theft of customer data 
2. Privacy 
3. Damaged intellectual property 
4. Integrity (data of machines and applications) 
• Availability and interruption of production (also in customer environ-
ment) 
 
 
Taulukko2. Tietoturvariskit 
Riskien listaaminen (Babar et. al. 2010, Sicari et al. 2014): 
• Haavoittuvuudet pilvirajapinnassa 
 
• Identiteetinhallinta (autentikointi, valtuuttaminen, kulunvalvonta, pääsynhallinta) 
 
• Kryptatyn liikenteen puutteet 
 
• Turvallinen tallentaminen (luotettavuus, avaintenhallinta, yhdenmukaisuus, saatavuus) 
 
• Tietoliikenteen uhat, tietoverkon haavoittuvuudet 
 
• Myöhäinen sidonta (late binding) (nimeämismekanismit, nimien ja järjestelmin yhteensovittami-
nen, implisiittisten nimien hallinta) 
 
• Fyysinen uhka (microproping, käänteinen suunnittelu) 
 
• Sulautettu turvallisuus (side channeling, datan peukalointi, komponenttien autentikointi, turvalli-
nen ympäristö) 
 
• Mobiiliturvallisuu, mobiilikäyttöliittymien haavoittuvuudet 
 
• Yksityisyys ja tietosuojan puutteet 
 
• Heikot suojausasetukset 
